The Gulf Of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) Region Is Among The World's Most Strategic

Andrew Korybko | South24

The past decade has seen the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea (GARS) region's strategic importance skyrocket among the world's most influential players. Foreign parties' attention was turned towards the GARS at the end of the century's first decade in response to the explosion of piracy taking place off of the Somali coast. This resulted in the commencement of various naval missions to thwart that threat and ensure freedom of navigation through those seas. The past half-decade, however, has been marked by an intensified competition between some of these same players in order to entrench their influential in this geostrategic space. 

The GARS' significance is that it's the shortest year-round maritime transit route between Western and Eastern Eurasia. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) through the Arctic is gradually becoming operational but isn't reliable during the winter months. Additionally, the GARS countries sit in the center of the tri-continental pivot space between Afro-Eurasia. This highly prized position can be utilized for economic and military purposes. The GARS countries can function as transshipment points for facilitating East-West trade as well as conveniently host related production facilities. They're also prime outposts for monitoring regional non-state threats. 

The Yemeni Civil War that began in 2014 and prompted the Saudi-led military intervention in March 2015 is the most destabilizing GARS crisis ever. The UN officially also regards it as the world's worst humanitarian crisis right now. Its impact has been much more destabilizing than the Ethiopian and Somali Civil Wars because of what's strategically at stake. Yemen's UN-recognized Hadi Administration, its Saudi-led international allies, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) accuse their Iran of exploiting the Ansarullah/Houthis as proxies in pursuit of controlling the GARS while those two actors lay the same accusation against them regarding their motives. 

«The Yemeni Civil War that began in 2014 is the most destabilizing GARS crisis ever»

Whichever way one flips it, the Yemeni Civil War eventually took on the optics of a larger struggle for control of the GARS. As it presently stands, the conflict is at a stalemate and neither side has established full control over this strategic space. It's worthwhile mentioning that the UAE unexpectedly became a major regional actor throughout the course of the war after it temporarily set up military bases in Eritrea and the breakaway region of Somaliland. Abu Dhabi is now regarded as the most important player in South Yemen, which includes the strategic islands of Mayun in the Bab-el-Mandeb and Socotra in the Gulf of Aden. 

On the other side of the GARS, Russia is in talks to set up a naval base in Sudan while Turkey already has a land base in Somalia. In between them lies Djibouti, which already hosts five foreign bases, including American and Chinese ones. That tiny country is considered to be the lifeline for landlocked Ethiopia, which is the continent's second most populous country and is presently in the midst of a serious internal conflict over the rogue Tigray Region. Ethiopia's troubles have attracted widespread international concern because of their potential humanitarian consequences. Addis Ababa also accuses the Arab League, Egypt, and the West of meddling. 

Its officials regard the West's implied political support of the terrorist-designated former ruling party faction of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) to be gross interference in their affairs and a potentially existential threat. Ethiopia also suspects Egypt and Sudan of arming the group as a proxy against it as part of their campaign to pressure Addis Ababa over the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). About that, the Arab League recently threw its support behind Egypt, which provoked Ethiopia's ire. If the situation there continues to deteriorate, it might become more destabilizing than the Yemeni Civil War. 

The international community at large has several interests with respect to the GARS. They most importantly want to ensure freedom of navigation through its waterways in order to not disrupt East-West trade. Secondly, while they officially hope for peace to prevail in the Yemeni and Ethiopian contexts, only a few of them are directly involved in those conflicts, some of whom are suspected of having ulterior motives that contradict their formally peaceful ones. Thirdly, the EU is especially concerned about those conflicts' potential intensification leading to large-scale refugees flows into the bloc.

«There's a possibility that two internationally unrecognized entities might take on more state-level characteristics just like Somaliland did»

It's important to point out that the two primary participants in each conflict – the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in that eponymous country – consider their campaigns to be of an urgent anti-terrorist nature. This reduces the likelihood that they'll compromise with their opponents anytime soon. Nevertheless, both conflicts are presently stalemated, though with heightened risk of re-erupting at any time. Some observers might believe that now is the best time for all parties to compromise, but that's difficult to do considering their respective motivations, including those of a vengeful nature. 

Cynically speaking, these GARS conflicts provide Machiavellian opportunities for other influential actors. Some might try to profit off of those wars by selling more arms to their participants, both the state-level and non-state ones of the Saudi-led coalition and Ethiopia and Ansarullah/Houthis and TPLF respectively. This means that their strategic proxy dimensions might widen, which could in turn reduce the chances of a peaceful settlement depending on which side ultimately receives more foreign support. For this reason, no optimistic forecasts can be made about either one ending anytime soon, though observers would be pleasantly surprised if they do. 

In the interim, there's a possibility that two internationally unrecognized entities might take on more state-level characteristics just like Somaliland did in the midst of the Somali Civil War. These are South Yemen and the Tigray Region. The former already de facto behaves as a state in everything but name while the latter has yet to achieve the level of stability that its cross-GARS structural counterpart does and perhaps might never will for reasons related to its comparatively disadvantageous geography and other factors. Even so, observers should pay more attention to them, especially their foreign partners (both real and alleged). 

Andrew Korybko
Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China's Belt & Road Initiative, and Hybrid Warfare.
- Photo: Reddit/u/AJgloe