Dr. Eman Zahran (South24) 

Different regional and international moves to achieve cease-fire requirements in Yemen and pave the way for peaceful settlement talks are undergoing a number of internal tests regarding the extent of actual consensus among the local parties. There is also a regional test represented in neutralizing the specific agendas in return of solving the "Yemeni issue". Recently, an international test cast a shadow amid the developments of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis and its variable political and economic dimensions on the Middle East in general and the Yemeni issue in particular. It is important to assess the direct effects of this crisis on the parties involved in the Yemeni issue, locally and regionally, as well as its direct reverberations on the comprehensive peace trajectories. This is in conjunction with the beginning of the 8th year of the "Yemeni crisis” given following points:

| First- The dimensions of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis

There are a number of motives behind Moscow’s latest escalation and the political withdrawal from the “Normandy Format" [1] in return of activating the military option in the Ukrainian territories given the following determinants:

1- The Russian re-position in the vital area:

This point is based upon the visions established between Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and his elite who back the hypothesis that it is a proper time to restore the Russian heavyweight in the international system.  For example, Mr. "Patrushev" and Mr. "Naryshkin" conducted prolonged interviews in which they spoke about their visions about global developments and the Russian international role. They believe that the system, led by the US, suffers from a deep crisis due to the failure of Western democracy and the internal conflicts which contradict the principles of tolerance, cultural pluralism and respect for minority rights. Additionally, they believe in restoring the "multipolarity" pattern. This reflects a drastic shift in different areas in the world regarding power and supporting the principles of authoritarianism and despotism. [2]

In the same context, Moscow has been able to reshape the structure of "the new international order", along with China, towards "multipolarity". The Western bloc failed to contain it. Furthermore, the Western fragile position has not been able to reproduce the "1991" scenario following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of its republics. The general international circumstances, according to the Russian mentality, became suitable for restoring “the international polarity” pattern. This is linked to a number of determinants, top of which are the fragility of the Western bloc, the diminution of the US power, changes in the regional and international alliances pattern. This is consistent with changes in the agendas and the size of non-traditional security files such as food security, health security, cyber security, environment security... etc. 

2- Besieging the vital area:

The tensions between Russia and Ukraine go back to the medieval era. Both countries have roots in the East Slavic state “Kyivan Rus”. In the 17th century, a large area of present-day Ukraine became part of the Russian empire. However, after the latter’s fall in 1917, Ukraine gained a brief period of independence before Soviet Russia occupied it again. This was followed by a series of events as part of the Russian moves to besiege this vital area in Ukraine, prominent of which are illustrated below: [3]

3- The fragility of the US Democratic Administration:

The Democratic Administration which governs the White House has been subjected to several "crucial tests" that proved how fragile it is in terms of external moves. This can be shown through looking at the decline of the US "deterrence force" due to the wars it has engaged in the Middle East and other areas in the world. This forced it to adopt a calculated approach towards the situation in Ukraine which didn’t go beyond a package of economic sanctions. Additionally, for example, there are negative ramifications for the American chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Aukus Submarine Deal between the US and Australia has led to coldness in the US-Australia relationships and the subsequent French anger because of the latter's exclusion from the deal. It is a sign of a coordination problem among the NATO parties. Moreover, this highlights Biden’s flabby approach towards reunifying NATO after a state of mistrust that was accumulated during the Trump era. The US also has suffered from internal turmoil since the polarization which follows the latest presidential elections. All of those indications show the fragility of the new US administration in a way that undermines all moves to deter Moscow's policies towards "Greater Russia".

4- The European Division:

The Past years added a state of vagueness and chaos to the European bloc. This has weakened the European stance toward the Ukrainian crisis. This is related to a number of scenes, mainly the Covid-19 pandemic’s negative consequences on all European economies. Furthermore, the German Chancellor Olaf Schulz still lacks the experience in dealing with the international crises. Germany also is keen to accelerate moving energy making it more dependent on Russian gas. As for Britain, it still manages the repercussions of leaving the European Union and the post-Brexit arrangements. Meanwhile, France faces crises related to its exit from Mali, presidential elections conflicts and the rise of the Right wings and etc... .

It is worth mentioning that the “Ukrainian crisis” dimensions imposed a European understanding towards the Russian demands, and pushed the European bloc to negotiate with Russia in favor of their military security for the first time since 1999. This move has contributed in revealing the “variable divisions” among the European states as some countries understand the Russian stance especially France and Germany and call for compromise. On the other hand, there are some countries which show more strict positions, especially some Eastern European states including Poland. 

5- The decline of NATO role:

It is considered one of the most prominent determinants as “NATO” seems more divided and weaker than ever. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron said in 2019: “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death [4] of NATO”. Likewise, Donald Trump publicly scorned it attacking its credibility due to the chaos which accompanied the US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Noteworthy, NATO’s current conditions are not militarily appropriate to engage in a highly-intense conflict. During past years, the European forces in NATO have considered the military affairs as just “a marginal emergency” or focusing on external operations. NATO no longer has the necessary mass and support required for such “high dense” operations. Meanwhile, NATO’s ability to manage a conflict largely diminishes if it has possible nuclear dimensions. 

| Secondly- The impact of the crisis on the parties involved in the Yemeni issue:

The Russian escalation declaration against Ukraine on Feb. 24th 2022 is considered the most prominent among a series of developments in the international system. The events have accelerated in an unprecedented way, so their impact goes beyond the European continent to the international system, global trade, energy and food supplies across the world. The structure of alliances, the levels of sub-territories, the rebound of the rising actors and the deep impact related to the moves by non-state actors are reconsidered. This is lined with the general Middle Eastern formations and the turmoil surrounding the Yemeni issue in particular. The repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis have led the active parties in the Yemeni file to reassess the events’ drivers, and reconsider their private agendas given the following points:

First: Local Actors:

- The assessment of the internationally-recognized Government: it has not declared any official stance towards the Ukrainian moves. This coincides with a number of international moves for ending the conflict in Yemen, top of which is the consensus of the UNSC’s Big Five as well as the EU for unlimited support of the UN moves led by the UN Envoy, Hans Grundberg, to stop the ongoing conflict. Moreover, in mid-March 2022, the Donors Conference was held to back the UN humanitarian response plan. It included international humanitarian messages. [5]

Accordingly, the most important possibility which should be understood by the internationally-recognized Government is that the Ukrainian crisis will have a negative impact on the Yemeni crisis as the Ukrainian war will likely lead to “temporarily break up the international consensus on the Yemeni file”. On the other hand, despite the decentralization of the Yemeni file, the waves of conflict could reach it, as Russia may seek to make a bigger involvement in Yemen for to enhance its international presence as part of policies that aim at “restoring influence” and driving out the “Western bloc” from the Middle East’s fulcrum zones. 

- The assessment of the Houthi stance: The Houthi position has witnessed obvious involvement following the dimensions of the Ukrainian crisis. On Feb. 21, 2022, the Houthi leader “Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi” announced that his group supports the Russian recognition of the two independent republics. [6] He also called Moscow for self-control so as to not slide into a war which aims to drain the Russian capabilities, in an indication that the Houthis support the Russian side. Additionally, the group counts on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the trajectory of the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations which are expected to be in favor of Tehran. This in turn could economically and militarily benefit the Houthis who are one of Iran’s arms in the region. Subsequently, this could weaken the path towards comprehensive peace in Yemen.

It is noteworthy that the UAE, one of the Arab Coalition’s two poles, has besieged the Houthi moves since the beginning of the Ukrainian war by gaining the approval of the UNSC to issue Resolution (2624) which classified the Houthis as a “terrorist group” [7] after the UAE made a swap with Russia by which Moscow didn’t use Veto against this Resolution while the UAE abstained to vote in favor of a resolution that condemns the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

Second: Regional Actors:

- The assessment of the Iranian stance: Iran supported the Russian moves, but its position has not been against the Ukrainian policies and motives but against the NATO’s policies. This is attributed to the possible Iranian benefits from this crisis, top of which are shown as below:

1- The talks about reviving the Iranian Nuclear Deal: All parties involved in “Vienna negotiations' ' have a certain role in the Ukrainian crisis. Thus, the possible escalation between Russia and the West can affect the Iranian nuclear file. Moscow could employ its effective role in these negotiations to pressurize the US and the West. Consequently, according to this prospect, Russia won’t pose any pressure on Tehran to reach quick understandings and could exploit this as a bargaining card against west. 

On the other hand, there is another reading for the path of the negotiation scene as the timing of the Ukrainian crisis could push all parties to rearrange files in a way that prioritizes reaching an end to the Ukrainian crisis, especially the Western bloc and Washington. This could give Iran more time to prolong the negotiation and try to extract more American concessions. Conversely, there is a possibility that the US and the Western bloc could move to reach a final agreement in return for pumping “Iranian oil” in the global markets to alleviate the European energy crisis which could escalate given the developments of events. Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves which theoretically enables it to supply energy to Europe and provide at least 20% of the European gas needs.

2- The abolition of the economic sanctions: If they begin to accelerate the process to reach a nuclear deal, Western bloc and Washington are likely to parallel end the Western sanctions imposed against Iran, and allow it again to pump oil into the European markets. For example, the International Energy Agency announced, on Feb. 11th 2022, that Tehran can add 1.3 million barrels of oil supplies per day in 2022 [8] in case of the elimination of sanctions against it. This means more financial resources which could enable it to spend again on its military militias and non-state arms such as the Houthis to restore its regional role and political project.

On the other hand, there are some Iranian concerns towards achieving such aspirations amid the Russian-Ukrainian crisis given the following points:

1- There are concerns regarding supporting the Russian stance in the Ukrainian crisis due to Russia’s recognition of the two separatist regions "Lugansk and Donetsk" which is something rejected by some Iranian politicians who consider this as a kind of inciting different nationalities to proceed with such separation projects. 

2- There are fears about the rearrangement of Western priorities and a possible distraction away from completing nuclear negotiations while addressing the negative repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis. For example, Washington intensified consultations with Gulf States, mainly the KSA to request pumping more energy in the global markets. 

3- There are concerns of approving the arrangements of moving Iranian gas to Europe as this requires a number of moves that are hard to skip, mainly the tension in the Turkish-Iranian relationships which would prevent Tehran from using Ankara Gas Pipeline Networks. Moreover, moving gas without passing through Turkey is costly as it requires building a pipeline through Azerbaijan to Georgia, or a pipeline via the Black Sea, or establishing a liquefied natural gas station. All of those options are very expensive. Investors may be reluctant to engage in such a project in light of the US sanctions without progress in the nuclear negotiations and lifting the economic sanctions. Additionally, there are fragile moves towards reviving the "Friendship Line" to export gas through Syria, Iraq and Lebanon due to a number of geopolitical challenges as well as the central vulnerability of those countries. We should not forget the most important point that Tehran was not interested in building gas transmission and liquefaction network infrastructure amid its national moves to enhance a strategy of replacing “oil” with “gas” to maximize oil exports.

- The assessment of the Arab Coalition's stance: This assessment is based upon the Saudi and the Emirati positions as follows:  

1- The Emirati stance: Abu Dhabi Government didn't condemn the Russia in the Ukrainian crisis   as part of its reassessment of the "international scene" dynamics given the following Emirati determinants:

● The UAE seeks to activate the "diversification of partners" strategy. For example, Abu Dhabi's military, security and economic partnerships with a number of states such as Israel, China and Russia recently in return for ending the "one ally" era. This comes in conjunction with a rift in the Emirati relationship with Washington since the Democratic President Joe Biden took office and the American withdrawal from the Middle East. Moreover, there is a growing Emirati doubtness about the ability of its US partner to protect its national security, especially after the Houthi attacks against Abu Dhabi during January and February 2022.

● The recent Russian intervention in the Middle East, especially in a number of troubled files such as Syria, Libya and Yemen. Because there is a military coordination in Yemen, Abu Dhabi fears from making any response which could irritate Russia and could harm the Emirati interests in that file. The UAE believes that its neutral- or even a supportive- stance towards Russia could push the latter to take the Emirati Middle Eastern security files into consideration, especially in Yemen and support its agenda there.

● The growing economic cooperation between the UAE and Russia as the UAE owns about 55% of the total Russian trade volume with the Gulf. The UAE is classified as among the most important Arab states for Russian trade as it comes in second place. The UAE is the first Arab destination for Russian investments as it owns about 90% from the Russian investments in the Arab states. In return, the UAE is the biggest Arab investor and represents 80% of the total Arab investments in Moscow. [9]

● The UAE’s bargain “vote card” bargain in the UNSC. as Abu Dhabi abstained to vote in favor of a Security Council’s resolution 

2- The Saudi stance: The Saudi stance is evaluated as being the alternative card for energy and oil supplies in light of the Russian move towards “energy militarization “as part of the variable ramifications of the Ukrainian crisis. Thus, the Saudi position is based upon a number of determinants top of which are:

● Maintaining the Saudi-Russian alliance in “OPEC+” as the two countries have managed the production and pricing system for oil and energy derivatives during past years. Thus, any breach in the mutual relationships due to the Ukrainian crisis could lead to possible Russian withdrawal from the oil alliance “OPEC+” [10] and the subsequent oil prices collapse to recreate the “2020 scenario”.

● The rift in the Saudi-American relationship has been linked with a number of signs, mainly the American withdrawal from supporting Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni file as well as Biden’s criticism against Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman regarding journalist Jamal Khashoggi case. Later, at the beginning of last year, Biden spoke about “resetting” the relationship with the KSA, a sign that denotes a desire for rapprochement with the USA’s ally.

● The Saudi trust in the USA has been shaken since September 2019 following the Abqaiq attack by Iranian missiles and drones against oil facilities without any reaction from the then- Republican US Administration. Such acts have increased after Biden’s declaration about the US withdrawal from the Middle East. This pushed the Middle East’s leaders to reach a conclusion that the US is no longer a reliable partner in regional security, and the need for “diversifying partners” , mainly the Russian partner. 

● The Ukrainian crisis energy repercussions could enhance Saudi economic gains. Riyadh seeks to balance the negative impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the kingdom’s economy during the past two years. For example, according to Bloomberg, if the oil prices remained at the level of over 18 dollars per barrel, and the Saudi production at the current daily level of over 19 million barrels, the total Saudi oil revenues will exceed 300 billion dollars in 2022 [11]. This could help in boosting the KSA’s financial revenues and support Bin Salman’s moves to achieve “Vision 2030” which aims at diversifying the Saudi economy.

Third: The international Actors:

- The assessment of the American stance: the American stance is characterized by much ambiguity especially that the priorities of the Yemeni file are likely to be rearranged given the developments of the Ukrainian crisis and the scale of its negative repercussions. This is accompanied with Moscow’s use of the “energy militarization”. This could push Washington to search for alternatives, mainly the KSA. However, the US is required to balance its political and security visions with the KSA in a number of high-priority points in the region including supporting the Riyadh’s moves in the Yemeni file and to make security designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group. 

- The assessment of the Russian stance: Moscow seeks for reposition in its areas of influence out of desire to achieve its foreign agenda represented in “Great Russia'' For example, Moscow seeks for deploying along the Red Sea coasts so as to likely find a foothold for it in the island of Socotra. This is in addition to the possible establishment of a Russian maritime base in Sudan. The Russian-Chinese rapprochement after the Ukrainian crisis paves the way for such theses as well as the Chinese expansion plans in the region through the “Silk Road” in which Socotra acts as fulcrum due to its pivotal centrality to manage the maritime trade operations in the region. Moscow is likely to enlist this as part of its agenda in the region.

- The assessment of the international stance: The international position still clings to find conciliatory formulas to pave the way towards achieving the requirements of a comprehensive solution. This has been monitored across the entire international moves and the various statements about the necessity to end the current crisis and its different repercussions at economic, security and humanitarian levels, especially after the consultations conducted by the UN Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, with the Yemeni parties in Amman. 

| Thirdly- The future of “bringing comprehensive peace”

The Ukrainian crisis has been met with wide scale attention among the Yemeni circles, especially as it came before the Donor Conference which aims at supporting the UN humanitarian response plan. This is in conjunction with growing concerns about the impact on the path of the “bringing comprehensive peace” operation which is likely to end as one of the two following trajectories: 

The first trajectory: Pushing for achieving peace requirements 

There are a number of indicators that could push for the peace operation scenario top of which are represented in the following points: 

1- The Ukrainian crisis developments could push the Russians to strengthen their presence in Yemen as a counter move against the Western and American alignment in the existing crisis. This hypothesis is enhanced by the Houthi siding with Russia since the beginning of the crisis, and their recognition of Donetsk and Lugansk separation as an attempt to woo Russia and push it to back the Houthi vision for bringing peace. 

2- While the Houthi initiative in mid Feb. 2022, which they delivered to Russia, is related only to humanitarian affairs, its core represents a move towards political operation. This acts as an attempt to dodge the Saudi initiative which calls for a “cease-fire first” followed by moving to comprehensive political settlement stages according to the Houthi perspective.

3- Attempting to elude the Ukrainian crisis repercussions, and its possible impact on the regional economic conditions, as well as the exacerbation of the food crisis, especially in Yemen which witnesses critical humanitarian conditions. For example, Yemen imports about 40% of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. With the development of events as well as the economic sanctions, this will negatively impact the fragile Yemeni economy. This could push different parties to achieve the political settlement requirements to escape the scenario of troubled “food security” and “humanitarian security”.

4- The path of this scenario could be pushed by the American endeavor to “reset” the relationship with the KSA. It tries to woo the kingdom to balance the energy market as part of the Ukrainian crisis developments. This requires Washington to show its bargaining chips. It is likely that the US will re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist group. This point could ruffle some feathers during the international negotiations for reaching peace in the Yemeni file.

The second trajectory: A deadlock and the ongoing conflict

This path is closer to reality, based upon the historical experience in dealing with the Yemeni file. This trajectory is related to a number of determinants as follows:

1- What will be imposed by the different Ukrainian crisis repercussions? This includes the need to rearrange priorities internationally while abandoning the Yemeni file. For example, in mid. Feb 2022, the fourth UN Envoy said that the regional dimensions of the Yemeni crisis play a big role in complicating its solutions. The Ukrainian crisis could impact states involved in Yemen such as KSA, the UAE and Iran, in light of the fact that they are oil producing and food importing countries. 

2- The future of the existing talks to reproduce the Iranian Nuclear Deal in light of the Ukrainian crisis consequences. These negotiations will directly impact the Iranian position at the military and economic levels. They will also have a direct effect on one of the most important Iranian arms (the Houthis). This risks more obstacles in the Yemeni peace trajectories. 

Finally, the Yemeni file constitutes an important point for study and research internationally in terms of the scale of different ramifications of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. Additionally, this is tied with different dimensions including the political one with its relevant to peace trajectories. The economic dimension is linked with   attempts to balance the economic fragility in the flabby state. The third one is the humanitarian dimension with efforts to prevent the exacerbation of the humanitarian conditions as well as supporting food security stability. This is in light of the worsening negative Ukrainian crisis ramifications and the impact of Corona virus Pandemic. 

The general indicators make the second trajectory hypothesis, “a deadlock and an ongoing conflict:” more likely to happen. It is obvious that the international community is pushed for rearranging its security and economic priorities given the scale of the geopolitical impact of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. The Western coordination with the regional actors will be limited at securing supplies to the energy market “oil and gas” with no regard to any political coordination in the security turmoil centers such as Yemen. On the other hand, the Western and American moves for “resetting relations” with the Gulf bloc, “Saudi Arabia and the UAE”, could push to present bargaining chips including backing the Gulf wings in Yemen and re-designating the Houthis as a terrorist group. This Western shift will contribute in boosting the regional and international trajectories for bringing comprehensive peace in Yemen. The verification measure will remain under test according to the entanglement mechanism among local and regional parties involved in the Yemeni issue and their variable agenda given the changes in the international community priorities. The coming period will reveal that.

Dr. Eman Zahran 

International Relations & Regional Security Specialist 

Photo: Reuters (Financial Times)

References:

1- The Normandy Format is known as a quad dialogue platform and an unofficial forum for the diplomatic channels. It was established in 2014 and led to the signing of the Minsk Agreement to alleviate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2015. Along with the crisis between two parties, Russia and Ukraine, the diplomatic platform includes the big European mediators, France and Germany. Since Jan. 2022, the quad talks in Berlin and Paris have resumed as part of The Normandy Format.

2- Alexander Gabuev, "Alexander Gabuev writes from Moscow on why Vladimir Putin and his entourage want war", The Economist, February 19th, 2022, Accessible at: econ.st 

3- The table is based upon the following sources: 

-The Causes of the War Between Russia and Ukraine. The Roots of the Conflict and its Developments, Al-Ahram Gate 24/2/2022, gate.ahram.org.eg

- Russia and Ukraine... Historic Conflict and Unannounced War Stations, Deutsche Welle, December 25th/2021, dw.com

-Paris: Macron brings Putin and Zelensky together for a summit on peace in Ukraine, France 24, Dec. 9th, 2019, france24.com

-Russia and Ukraine: What After Putin Recognizes the Independence of Donetsk and Luhansk? BBC News Arabic, Feb.22nd, 2022, bbc.in

4- Macron considers NATO in a state of "brain death", France 24, Nov. 7th, 2019, france24.com

5- 36 donors pledge about 1.3 billion $ to Yemen out of 4.3 billion $ needed for humanitarian response, United Nations website March 16th 2022, news.un.org

6- Margaret Dene, Hannah Labow, Carol Silber, Middle East Responses to the Ukraine Crisis, The Washington Institute, 4/3/2022.

7- The Security Council adopts a resolution that impose arms embargo against the Houthis as an entity, United Nations website, February 28th, 2022

8- Shorouk Saber, Alternative Options: What Will Happen If the Vienna Negotiations Fail? Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Feb.22nd 2022

9- Why did the UAE Abstain from Condemning the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in the Security Council? Al-Khaleej Online, February 26th, 2022.

10- Where Do the Gulf States Stand in the Russian War against Ukraine? The New Khaleej, 1/3/2022 thenewkhalij.news

11- The Stances of the Actors in the Middle East on the Ukrainian Crisis: Trends and Determinants "2", Political Street, March 14th 2022