Situation Assessment: The Outcome of Israel’s Direct Involvement in Yemen

On July 19, the Houthis claimed responsibility for a military drone strike that hit part of Tel Aviv’s center near the US Embassy, killing a 50-year-old Israeli man and injuring others. The Houthis said they carried out the operation by using a new drone called “Yafa” which “is capable of penetrating the enemy’s interception systems and can’t be detected by radars”. This is the first time the Houthis have caused human casualties, despite launching more than 200 attacks against Israel according to the latter’s Defense Minister. 

However, the Houthis paid a heavy cost the following night when Israel launched a comprehensive attack by using twelve F-35 planes. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attack targeted the Ras Kathib power station, gas depots, and 20 oil storage facilities in the Red Sea port of Hodeidah.(1)

The Israeli air strike caused a huge fire that continued to burn for hours, and according to reports destroyed two-thirds of the strategic fuel reserves in the Port of Hodeidah. According to the American news site ‘Axios’, “the attack was conducted in coordination with the U.S. and the international coalition formed to counter Houthi attacks”. The Israeli attacks on the Port of Hodeidah killed six people and injured 83 others, in addition to three persons who are reported to be missing, according to Reuters.

On the other hand, a Houthi leader has vowed that the Israeli raids on the Port of Hodeidah “will be met with escalation”. Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, member of the Houthi political bureau, stressed that Israel will “pay the price” for these attacks. Indeed, within hours, the Houthis carried out military operations, using ballistic missiles and drones to attack Umm Al-Rashrash (Eilat) and the American ship ‘Pumba’ in the Red Sea, in response to the Israeli attacks, according to the Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea. The Yemeni Internationally Recognized Government condemned the Israeli attack on the Port of Hodeidah. In a strongly worded statement, the IRGY held Israel, “fully responsible for any repercussions of its airstrikes. including deepening the humanitarian crisis that has been exacerbated by the Houthi militia’s terrorist attacks against oil facilities and international navigation lines”.

Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, based on their strategic weight as states overlooking the Red Sea, issued statements on the Israeli strikes against Hodeidah. Cairo “called on all parties to exercise restraint. and de-escalation and to avoid slipping into regional chaos”. Egypt also “urged all actors at both the regional and international levels to assume their responsibilities to end the Israeli war in Gaza, which is the main cause of the heightened tension and current regional escalation". On the other hand, Saudi Arabia was quick to deny any involvement in the Israeli strike, and stressed “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no relation or involvement in targeting Hodeidah”. In a statement, the official spokesperson for the Saudi Ministry of Defense, Brigadier General Turki Al-Maliki said “Saudi Arabia won’t allow any entity to violate its air space from any direction”.

It is important to point out that the Port of Hodeidah is considered the only decisive point for the entry of all goods, including food and oil which constitute a basic factor for the life of people in areas controlled by the Houthis. The port is crucial for providing more than 70% of Yemen's food needs. According to the Israeli army’s security evaluation, following the air strikes, Hodeidah port has become incapable of unloading goods. Besides destroying the fuel storage facilities, the Israeli air strikes also damaged the cranes used for unloading goods from ships to the dock. There is a high probability that the damage to the port will lead to a severe lack of fuel in many areas in North Yemen over the coming period. Moreover, the massive damage to the Ras Kathib power station at Hodeidah will exacerbate the suffering of the people amid a very hot summer, especially in the hot coastal areas overlooking the Red Sea.

Over the years of the conflict, the Houthis earned billions of dollars from the revenues generated from the customs and taxes imposed by them on the imports through the Port of Hodeidah. Previously, the Houthis hindered the 2018 “Stockholm Agreement”, that was proposed by the UN with an aim to allocate the revenues generated from oil sales through the Port of Hodeidah for paying the salaries of state employees. This had to be achieved by sending the revenues to a special account affiliated with the Yemeni Central Bank in Hodeidah Governorate. However, since the declaration of the UN-sponsored truce in 2022, the Houthis have looted nearly 1.6 trillion Yemeni riyals from Hodeidah port. Additionally, they have made use of the Iranian oil, smuggled to them through the port of Hodeidah. This has been part of the military funding to the Houthis who sell the oil later in the Yemeni markets.

With Hodeidah port damaged, the Houthis will likely face a sharp economic crisis during the next period, especially as they have lost an important economic resource. The only thing that may remain for them is to import oil from Aden or Marib to prevent a choking fuel crisis that may lead to massive popular demonstrations in the areas under their control. This will accordingly see the economic issue as a main and urgent topic of discussion in any imminent negotiations, especially since the Houthis would be suffering from critical situations in all directions. The damage to Hodeidah port can provide an opportunity to the recognized government to begin re-exporting oil from the port of Al-Dabba in Hadramout, after it was completely halted as a result of the Houthi attacks on the Yemeni ports in October 2022. This will also provide an opportunity to renew discussions about the economic file as a whole, and not partially. Thus, the recognized government will get the space to maneuver by using a strong pressure card that would allow it to tighten the noose on the Houthis, especially as the latter will need oil from the government areas in the aftermath of the Israeli strike on the Port of Hodeidah.

However, the inability to take political decisions by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which surrenders to the regional and international pressure, constitutes a main problem that delays solving many key issues. The latest and not the last of these moves by the PLC is the postponement of the punitive measures imposed by the Central Bank of Aden against commercial banks that violated its directive to shift their main headquarters from the Houthi-controlled city of Sanaa to the capital, Aden, in South Yemen. According to information obtained previously by ’South24 Center’, the UN Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg and Saudi Arabia pressured the recognized government to reverse the Central Bank of Aden’s decisions. This came after the Houthi threats on July 7 to strike Saudi airports, banks, and harbors. Many Yemeni observers criticized a letter sent by the UN Envoy to the PLC in which he called for postponing the Central Bank of Aden’s economic measures in order to avoid a possible military escalation according to him. The observers considered this as being an intervention in favor of the Houthis, and felt that a firmer stance needed to have been taken when the Iran-backed militia hit oil ports in South Yemen or when the Houthis created currency divisions, looting the banks’ assets as well as the salaries of employees. 

Meanwhile, the recognized government responded to the Saudi and UN pressure and froze the Central Bank of Aden’s decisions till the end of August 2024. It seems that Riyadh actually is keen to avoid engaging in another confrontation with the Houthis following two years of truce and bilateral talks between the two parties, mediated by Oman. Moreover, Saudi Arabia won’t risk its rapprochement with Iran after restoring the bilateral relationship with it nearly one and a half years ago. On the other hand, it seems that Tehran too doesn’t want to push Riyadh away from the Beijing-brokered agreement of March 2023. This is even though each party supports different camps in several tangled disputes in the region, especially in Syria and Yemen.

Yemenis in areas under the Houthi control suffer from having their ports overlooking the Red Sea turned into platforms to launch Iranian missiles and drones, based on Tehran’s calculations and priorities and not the Yemeni ones. Furthermore, people in these areas face the woes of war exponentially due to the Houthi’s ongoing violations against them. This exacerbates their humanitarian and security suffering. This is along with the negative ramifications of the irresponsible Houthi practice of using the civil ports for military purposes, which has led to the complete destruction of the port infrastructure due to the strikes.

The latest development of the Israeli direct involvement in the Yemeni file leads to two scenarios:

The Israeli pressure, the growing economic woes, and the deterioration in the public utility services and livelihood conditions in the Houthi-controlled areas may push the group to return to the regional negotiation table on the Yemeni file, led by Saudi Arabia and Oman. This will accordingly lead to de-escalation in the Red Sea. The Houthis have repeatedly sought to avoid dialogue to achieve more gains by their attacks against maritime navigation. Therefore, the additional pressure of the Israeli attacks may force the Houthis to surrender to regional conditions and enter new negotiations, especially in light of the economic losses incurred by the group. This may accordingly strengthen the position of the recognized government, not only in the economic file but also the political and military ones, especially if there is a political decision and a unified will.

The Israeli direct interventions may encourage the Houthis for more escalation. This would expand the scope of the conflict and internationalize it, especially if the Republicans win the US elections, led by Donald Trump who previously classified the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. This may include broader American interventions in the Red Sea, beyond the defensive security operations carried out by the so-called ’Prosperity Guardian‘, to comprehensive offensive operations.

This scenario appears to be a horrifying one as it moves the conflict to a higher level, and would especially jeopardize the livelihood and economic conditions of people on both sides, whether in areas controlled by the Houthis or those governed by the recognized government. It is important to stress that all relevant parties bear responsibility for solving this crisis, including local, regional, and international ones. This can be attained by taking firm steps to stop the Houthi practices that threaten peace and stability and protect the Yemeni people from more suffering.