Reasons Behind the Delay in the Iranian Response Against Israel

All regional and international circles have recently been obsessed with the possible response against Israel by Iran and its affiliated factions. This comes amid the escalations since the July 30 assassination of Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr in a Beirut suburb and that of Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran a day later. However, till the moment of writing this paper, the Iranian response has not gone beyond recruitment as well as media and propaganda mobilization. This raises a number of hypotheses, some of which are related to the divisions within the Iranian decision-making circles regarding the feasibility and interests of a comprehensive escalation with Israel. Others are linked to the war in Gaza and the path of the new negotiations for a ceasefire-hostage release deal that began in Doha on August 15 and are scheduled to continue in Cairo over the next few days.

Despite taking into consideration the previous assumptions, all current indications point to the inevitability of the Iranian response in light of Tehran’s quest to establish deterrence rules on Israel. This is along with a possibility that Iran will consider the “limits of its response” due to the high cost of the comprehensive escalation scenario. In this regard, this paper seeks to understand the main reasons and determinants behind the delay of the Iranian response as well as discussing its possible pattern.

On August 16, 2024, ‘The New York Times‘ quoted American, Israeli, and Iranian officials as saying that “Iran is expected to delay planned reprisals against Israel to allow mediators time to make a high-stakes push for a cease-fire to end the war in Gaza”.[1] Over the recent days, growing leaks have endorsed this hypothesis. In this regard, the hypothesis of Iran delaying its response can be confirmed, given the fact that over 20 days have elapsed since the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of the capital, Tehran. The reasons related to the delay of Iran’s response operation can be understood in light of the following considerations:

1- Divisions Within Iran’s Decision-Making Circles: A report by British newspaper ‘The Telegraph’ pointed to divisions inside Iran regarding responding to Israel. It added that “Iran’s new president is battling against the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in an attempt to prevent all-out war with Israel”.  According to the newspaper, “Top generals within the IRGC are insisting on a direct strike on Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, focusing on military bases to avoid civilian casualties but the Iranian President has suggested targeting secret Israeli bases in Iran’s neighboring countries.”[2]

These revelations carry a number of important inferences. The first is that the new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian believes that delivering a big strike against Israel may push toward an open war that Tehran does not need. The second is that the approach of the new Iranian President is based on calculations related to his quest to solve Iran’s pending issues, and not add more crises during his tenure. The third one is that the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and top military commanders may push toward delivering a major strike on Israel. The fourth is that there is almost an agreement about the need to respond to Haniyeh’s assassination. However, there are disagreements on the nature and limits of this response.

2-Iran’s Concerns about the Cost of a Comprehensive Confrontation: Despite the repeated Iranian threat that “all options are on the table to deal with the Israeli escalation, including engaging in a direct and open confrontation”, the Iranian approach has so far leant toward avoiding this scenario. This is based on some concerns related to the cost of a comprehensive war with Tel Aviv. Firstly, Iran realizes that engaging in a comprehensive war practically means using its maximum military and strategic capabilities which is a highly costly option. Secondly, a comprehensive war scenario may hamper several Iranian arrangements with some international forces. Thirdly, this scenario may negatively affect the Iranian nuclear file, whether through referring it to the UN Security Council by Washington or through Israel’s possible move to hit the Iranian nuclear facilities. These considerations harm Iran’s strategic interests, given the fact that Tehran is close to making a nuclear bomb. Iran has largely developed its nuclear program. The quantity of enriched uranium owned by Iran has increased 22 times more than what was stipulated in the nuclear deal of July 14, 2015.

3-The American and Western Pressure on Tehran: A main consideration that has so far contributed to delaying the Iranian response against Israel is the massive American-European pressure on Tehran in this regard. It can be said that this pressure has taken several forms, oscillating between one of military nature and the political-diplomatic one. At the military level, the United States announced a big military deployment in the region in anticipation of an Iranian attack. One August 12, the Pentagon announced sending a guided missile submarine to the Middle East [3] and speeding up the arrival of a group of attack aircraft carriers to the region. In early August, reports [4] said that the United States had deployed more than 12 destroyers and warships in the Gulf and the Middle East in anticipation of a possible Iranian response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and Fuad Shukr. At the diplomatic level, Western powers have imposed significant pressure on Tehran. On August 4, ‘The Wall Street Journal’ said that “the United States sent strong warnings to Iran via mediators that “launching a big strike against Israel will be followed by a response”.[5] Moreover, as part of the European diplomatic endeavors, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and French President Emmanuel Macron, issued a joint statement on August 12 urging Tehran against further inflaming tensions in the region. The statement called on Iran not to “jeopardize the opportunity to agree to a ceasefire and the release of hostages” in Gaza.[6] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer also held separate phone calls with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on August 12 to tell him to not attack Israel. However, the latter stressed his country’s “right to respond” to any aggression targeting it.

The American-Western approach of oscillating between military and diplomatic elements as part of the pressure on Iran has been linked to some main considerations. The first is that the US has been keen since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel on threatening to use force and military deployment, not to directly engage in regional escalation but to avoid the outbreak of an expanding regional war. The second consideration is that this large military deployment on the other side ensures deterring Israel from making any uncalculated moves in the region and to rely only upon limited operations carried out by Western allies against some Iranian arms such as the Houthis instead of direct involvement. The third one is that the United States and the European nations, in particular, are largely obsessed by the qualitative developments of the Ukrainian War. Thus, the growing escalation in the Middle East isn't in their favor.

4-The Calculation Related to the Gaza War: Significantly, US President Joe Biden, on August 13, told reporters he expects Iran to hold off on possibly attacking Israel if a Gaza ceasefire and hostage deal is reached in the next few days. 7] In general, it seems that the calculations about an Iranian retaliatory strike have largely been linked to the cease-fire talks on Gaza. In this regard, reports said that Qatari Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, contacted the Iranian acting Foreign Minister All Bagheri Kani by phone on August 16, calling for self-restraint regarding carrying out any attack on Israel as “there is a remarkable progress in the path of negotiations”.[8]

There are some main observations, the first of which is that Iran has concerns regarding its possible response against Israel as this may complicate the path of talks. The second is that the delay in the Iranian response has turned from a pressing factor affecting the path of talks into a factor affiliated with the talks, depending on their results. The third is that the United States believes in the need to ensure the success of the current round of ceasefire talks to avoid the Iranian response and an escalation scenario in the region.

By reading the scene and the current contexts related to the dimensions and limits of the possible Iranian response against Israel, it can be said that the previous considerations “have delayed the Iranian response against Israel and not necessarily revoked it”. This is in light of some main considerations, the first of which is that the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of Tehran, and just hours after the inauguration of the new President at an event attended by leaders from over 80 nations, has caused acute embarrassment to Iran. This embarrassment affected the internal sphere, especially after the hardline fundamentalists controlled the Iranian parliament in the March legislative elections, as well as Tehran’s affiliated factions in the region. The second one is that Iran seeks to maintain the mutual deterrence rules against Israel. The third is that by this response, Tehran hopes to confirm the effectiveness of its military capabilities, not necessarily for incurring heavy losses on Israel, but at least to assert the Iranian ability to target the Israeli depth. In light of these determinants, the possible features and scenarios of the Iranian response can be illustrated as below:

1-Targeting the Israeli Depth Directly: The Iranian response will likely adopt the pattern of targeting the Israeli depth directly like what happened in April. Remarkably, the April 13 attack had small military consequences. Four ballistic missiles fired by Iran evaded Israel’s air defenses and hit the Nevatim Air Base in the Negev desert, where Israeli F-35 fighter jets are based, causing “light damage”. The attack was in response to Israel’s bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria on April 1. In view of some of its missiles having successfully evaded Israeli air defenses, Iran may be keen now on targeting some important Israeli military bases and centers, in addition to Tel Aviv itself.

2- Targeting Israeli External Interests: A possible hypothesis regarding the Iranian response against Israel is that Tehran may target Israeli external interests, including some diplomatic missions or Israeli military deployments in some countries. The related estimates by Israeli security bodies can be indicated by what was announced on August 12, when the Israeli state-owned Kan news reported that “the military had issued a directive on Sunday (August 11) ordering all off-duty soldiers who are currently in Georgia or Azerbaijan to return to Israel immediately, fearing a possible Iranian attack”.

3- A Hybrid Pattern of the Iranian Escalation: The most likely scenario regarding the Iranian response against Israel would be Tehran’s reliance on a “hybrid” pattern. This pattern would vary between targeting the Israeli depth directly and the escalation through agents, especially by the Lebanese Hezbollah that has vowed to avenge the assassination of its most important military leader Fuad Shukr.

In general, it can be said that the delay in a possible Iranian response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh has been largely related to internal divisions in Iran about the response. This is in addition to the massive Western pressure, along with the resumption of the Gaza ceasefire talks. However, these factors have likely contributed to delaying the Iranian response and not revoking it. This means that what separates the region from the "edge of the abyss" scenario is dependent on the path of the Gaza ceasefire talks as well as the limits and nature of the Iranian response and how Israel will deal with it.