Editorial: How Can the STC Reset its Position?

The last few days have witnessed a remarkable escalation in political and security tensions in some areas of South Yemen. The events included a “terrorist attack” carried out by the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), using a car bomb in Mudiyah district of Abyan governorate on August 16. The attack, which killed 16 soldiers and injured 17 others, targeted the Southern forces participating in the ’Arrows of the East‘ operation against the terror organization. It appears the attack was aimed at increasing the security tension in South Yemen. Prominent officials from the Southern forces and the STC hinted about the presence of local and regional groups that support these attacks. Furthermore, international reports previously indicated that the AQAP received training from the Iran-backed Houthi militia on the attack drones they have used over the past months.

Many Southerners believe that disturbing the security scene currently would only play into the local and regional parties seeking to exploit the state of chaos. While the STC considers itself responsible for the security and stability of the Southern areas located under its influence, these parties make use of any turmoil to expand and enhance their situation or that of their agents in the Yemeni scene. They exploit the tough economic and humanitarian conditions as well as social and security issues to stir territorial tensions like what happened in the “case of Colonel Ashal 1 ”. The STC obviously condemned this case and called for arresting the culprits as soon as possible, regardless of their legal status. The STC expressed its keenness for revealing the circumstances of the case to clear its name of the accusations of being somehow involved as was being alleged by its political rivals who aspire to revive the extinct political conflicts that have been overpassed through the biggest reconciliation and forgiveness process witnessed by the country.

In recent times, the political and economic tensions have been more prominent in Hadramout. Despite there being no serious divisions within the Hadrami political entities since the beginning of the conflict in Yemen in 2014, tensions have largely escalated over the past two years. The formation in January 2023 of the Saudi-led ‘Nation Shield Forces’, which are nominally headed by Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi, has exacerbated the existing tensions. This military formation has been met with many reservations, especially by the STC supporters who deem these forces as a threat to their authority. This is in light of Al-Alimi’s desire to replace them as an alternative to the Hadrami Elite Forces, that are close to the STC, in the coast of Hadramout and deploy them in parts of Lahj, Al-Dhalea, and Aden. Moreover, the establishment of the ‘Hadramout National Council’ in Riyadh last year, which is seen as a Saudi project, has increased the severity of political divisions in the governorate in a way that threatens the efforts for uniting ranks and achieving stability in the Southern areas.

Regarding the economic decisions 2 imposed by the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government against the Houthis, these faced growing pressure from Saudi Arabia and UN Envoy, Hans Grundberg, leading to backing off from the decisions. This has stirred much resentment at the governmental and public level, especially as these decisions were aimed at confronting the economic challenges imposed by the Houthis. As a result, the sudden visit by the PLC Chairman Al-Alimi to Hadramout on July 27 was met with angry responses by the Hadrami street. Many opponents believe that the main aim behind the visit was to enhance Al-Alimi’s power to control the governorate’s affairs. This is in addition to pushing for re-exporting oil from Hadramout and sharing its revenues with the Houthis under external pressure. This especially came after the PLC withdrew the economic decisions that oppose delivering facilities to the Houthis or surrendering to their policies.

Therefore, these developments have stirred concerns among many Southerners regarding the future of the resources in their areas, especially in oil and gas concession areas in Hadramout and Shabwa. Therefore, the STC’s bodies have only issued statements to express their categorical rejection of any attempts to divide Hadramout or disrupt its decisions. They called for uniting efforts to wrest the rights of Hadramout over the vast oil and gas resources and benefiting from their revenues. The expanded meeting by the STC’s bodies, held in Mukalla on August 26, isn’t even an exception despite the importance of establishing a committee to communicate with the local parties there to unite the Hadrami ranks in the face of challenges.

Organized media campaigns by Yemeni local and regional media platforms  have long been directed against Southern leaders, especially those affiliated with the STC. For example, accusations have been recently launched against forces affiliated with the PLC Vice President, Abdulrahman Al-Muhrrammi, of raiding and storming an office affiliated with the Presidency in the capital, Aden, last month and pushing the office director to leave the city. However, an official source in the PLC denied these accusations against Al-Muhrrammi. He stressed that he is fully aware of the incident and that it was dealt with legally. Concurrently, abuses related to the incident were deleted after being published by major Saudi media outlets. The campaigns against the Southern politicians who espouse the project of establishing an independent state in South Yemen are considered part of a wider conflict derived from some intervening factors, including the influence of the STC and its popularity in large areas in South Yemen. Therefore, some Yemeni Northern and regional forces seek to reduce this influence. This is especially related to the fact that the resources of South Yemen, with some of its areas controlled by leaders affiliated with or close to the STC, are considered a vital artery of the Yemeni economy and constitute about 80% of the country’s total revenues.

The STC faces a widespread wave of criticism by its supporters who denounce its silence toward the tightening of restrictions on it politically, economically, and militarily. This comes at a time in which the STC has allowed parties in the legitimate authority, led by Rashad Al-Alimi, to exclude it from the political front. The STC is losing control over its stances. As a result, many Southerners feel that the latest positions of the STC are negative and short-sighted in a way that deepens their concerns. The STC has left several key files in the hands of Rashad Al-Alimi though earlier it used to exert pressure on several issues, including corruption and the humanitarian and services conditions. Thus, their retreat from responsibility has led to further deterioration coupled with the laxity and silence of other PLC Vice presidents. There are several delayed decisions, whether due to not reaching agreement on them or rejecting some appointments. On the other hand, no alternatives have been submitted in their stead. For example, there has been a deadlock regarding replacing Yemeni ambassadors whose assignment periods in missions abroad have expired. The period of assignment for the majority of them in the host countries ended years ago. Some embassies have been without ambassadors for more than two years such as the Yemeni Embassy in Germany which was led by Yahia Al-Shoeibi who left it after being appointed as Head of the Presidential Office since establishment of the PLC in 2022. This is in addition to the impasse in the Internationally-Recognized Government on the file of changes since the appointment of its new PM Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak in February this year. The only exception has been the appointment of Foreign Minister Shayea Al-Zindani, which was also opposed by some PLC members.

This reveals that delay is worse than deterioration as it ultimately impacts the workflow. Regardless of the level of deterioration in work systems and institutions in the areas controlled by the Internationally-Recognized Government, this will pose less damage than the failure accompanying delay. This in turn has led to the decline of services and livelihood. This reality reflects the depth of the political crisis impacting parties in the legitimate authority camp. It further exposes the position of the STC, which is apparently hesitant in taking up responsibility, especially in areas under its control, where the furious reactions may affect its popularity. It seems that the STC seeks to hold Rashad Al-Alimi fully responsible for the current situation, including allowing regional and international pressure to impact the political Yemeni decision-making. Notably, the STC wants to avoid any direct confrontation that would impact its relationship with Saudi Arabia. However, this stance shouldn’t be taken as absolving the STC from issuing outright statements that publicly announce its acceptance or opposition to the pressures. This is related to the fact that the STC used to earlier express its political stances in a strong and clear way for a long time since its establishment as a political entity.

In fact, the humanitarian situation in areas controlled by the Internationally-Recognized Government is getting worse. A report by the World Bank in June this year states that “the fiscal situation of the Internationally Recognized Government deteriorated significantly in 2023, driven by a substantial drop in oil revenues and diminished customs revenues due to the redirection of imports from Aden to Houthi-controlled ports”. Most of the imports have stopped due to the exacerbating tensions in the Red Sea. So far, the Internationally Recognized Government enjoys a limited ability to provide the simplest services or deal with the growing challenges. This threatens escalating risks amid the delay of several files.

Regarding previous factors along with the restrictions imposed on the STC’s participation in the Council’s decisions and stance, it is important to say that the STC seriously needs to revise its policies and the quality of its internal and external allies as well as go beyond raising mere slogans and issuing warning statements to relieve itself of embarrassment. Southern political leaders should look at the negative impact these weak policies are having, and to which they contribute, whether consciously or unconsciously. The circle of discontent is expanding as despair and depression spread among many Southerners of ever achieving a possible breakthrough in their living conditions or realizing the delayed goals promised by their leader for years. The STC has maintained its wide popular rapport which has repeatedly confused Yemeni and regional parties. However, the continuation of this relaxed pace will only allow other parties to benefit from the situation and probably make changes on the ground at the security, military, and political levels. This may gradually isolate the STC, making it drift away from its audience.

The STC, that has currently reached top power position, had to design coherent plans to maintain itself as a political entity and protect its goals that it drew since its ascendance. Meanwhile, it has to pursue and exert pressure in order to provide services to the people, at least in areas under its influence. It will be useful for the STC to ponder on the ways it can play a more effective role at all levels, including with regard to its internal and external management whose activities have declined compared to earlier.

It is important to state that the STC needs to reset its political stances and draw coherent and coordinated strategies on which any Southerner can rely upon regarding different issues. It remains to be seen whether the STC will deal with the challenges and threats, some of which have emerged recently after a long political stagnation, or will it continue to escape its responsibilities and practice an isolating role which may lead to more tension and instability in the areas under its control. The Southern intra-cohesion and the expansion of the base of its local allies will be necessary for the success of the hoped for STC policy. This may spare them from a circle of conflict that targets them from different directions. It is still too early to deem the assignment by President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) Aidrous Al-Zubaidi to his deputy Abdulrahman Al-Muhrrammi to manage the security and counterterrorism file in the Southern forces as one of the resetting moves.