Even if Iran wants to use the Houthis as an interim spearhead to threaten Israel in the region, the group is still unqualified for several reasons.

Farida Ahmed (South24 Center)

The past few days have witnessed an escalation of events between Israel and Iran. This came after the Lebanese Hezbollah received the most fatal blow with the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, the foremost leader in the group and probably in Lebanon as a whole. This was preceded by a massive incursion into the Hezbollah group’s network when thousands of its members were severely injured when their ’pagers‘ and ’wireless‘ devices exploded simultaneously across many areas in Beirut and other cities of south Lebanon. The Hezbollah has held Israel fully responsible for these operations that targeted its members who work in institutions affiliated with the group.

Days after the September 27 assassination of Nasrallah, Iran responded by launching about 200 missiles toward Tel Aviv on October 1, stressing that 90% of them reached their targets, including three Israeli military bases. Israel vowed that Iran would pay a “heavy price” for the attack. In response, Tehran warned of a “more powerful response” in case of any Israeli attack against it. Meanwhile, the Israeli-Iranian game is apparently farcical in light of the mutual repeated threats. Iran classifies its moves as a retaliation to the assassination of Hamas’ political chief Ismail Haniyeh on July 31 in Tehran and Hassan Nasrallah in a southern suburb of Beirut. After a two month wait, it was expected that Iran would target more sensitive sites in Tel Aviv or carry out an assassination operation at least against an influential Israeli leader, especially since the confrontation redlines have been crossed during the escalating war since October 7, 2023. This has intensified the view that what happened is just fireworks parties launched by Iran occasionally, similar to its April attacks when it launched 300 missiles and drones against Israel, causing only minor damage. 

However, the dangerous speed of the Iranian missiles shouldn’t be downplayed. For the first time, Iran used Fateh hypersonic missiles that have a range of 1,400 km and their speed ranges between Mach 13-15 which is five times the speed of sound. Therefore, confronting such missiles is usually a difficult task. The Iranian missiles confused the Israeli air defense systems, including the ’Iron Dome‘, while trying to thwart the missiles during the October 1 attack. Thus, responding to this attack can serve as “an unprecedented opportunity for Israel to undermine the Iranian regime”, according to the Hebrew newspaper ’Yedioth Ahronoth’.  Moreover, the Israeli attack “will be a comprehensive one by targeting Iran’s vital infrastructure such as oil refineries, power facilities, and industrial centers, in addition to wide-scale cyber-attacks that aim to disable Iran’s command and control system”.

Amid the escalating tension, the US Biden administration is seeking to reach de-escalation and avoid the eruption of a comprehensive war in the Middle East. It has urged Israel not to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in response to the Tehran attacks. On the other hand, the US presidential candidate Donald Trump has urged Israel to strike the Iranian nuclear facilities. He believes that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons will lead to more problems. In fact, the current data points to a possible escalation in terms of the parties’ determination of mutual military responses and Iran’s keenness to protect its agents in the region after losing prominent figures over a short span of time. For decades, Iran’s proxies have constituted a tangled chain of power and threats against rivals in the region, including threatening Saudi Arabia through the Houthis. Furthermore, it is the first war in which Iran has been forced to get directly involved since its war against Iraq in the 1980s.

The Impact on the Houthis

The Houthis so far enjoy an advantageous position that enables them to continue their attacks on maritime vessels in the Red Sea. The ongoing strikes on several locations in North Yemen, including Hodeidah and Ras Issa Red Sea ports on September 29, haven't undermined the Houthi activities. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and on Tel Aviv have increased, especially since the killing of Hassan Nasrallah. Although the Israeli attacks on Lebanon have largely reduced the capabilities of Hezbollah, they haven't eliminated the group as a political and military power that still owns an arsenal of weapons and missiles as well as thousands of fighters. Iran still considers Hezbollah the “crown jewel” of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” affiliated with it. Even if Iran wants to use the Houthis as an interim spearhead to threaten Israel in the region, the group is still unqualified for several reasons. The first is that they lack adequate strength or experience similar to what Hezbollah has. This is because the Houthis are a young movement that have been trained by Hezbollah leaders. The second reason is due to the geographical barriers and the long distance, compared to Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria where Iran’s militias are spread. The third and most important reason is that Iran views the Houthis as less valuable than its other Shiite proxies in the region. Previously, Saeed Qassimi, a leader in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, described the Houthis as being “street Shiites” who are different from the “civilized Shiites of Lebanon”. This description reflects at least a downgrading outlook toward the Houthis. This reduces the possibilities of replacing the Hezbollah with the Houthis who could be used only by Iran as a main tool in the Southern entrance of the Red Sea to continue their threats whenever necessary.

It isn’t unlikely that Israel will adopt the same approach toward the Houthis by destroying the group’s leadership structure, as it has done to the Hezbollah and Hamas. Compared to devastating the capabilities of the more coherent, organized, and experienced Hezbollah, this may be an easier task for Israel. This will depend on how accurately Israel can reach the Houthi locations, especially as their leadership hierarchy is limited to Houthi Leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi and some figures close to him. He is the one who issues directives and makes appointments while other authorities are only nominal and have no notable importance or influence. It can be acknowledged that Israel succeeded in eliminating its enemies by relying on advanced intelligence to carry out its military operations in Lebanon while Iran has failed to do the same, even inside its territories.

It is important to state that the most dangerous move to which Hezbollah can resort to over the coming period, according to many estimates, is that of “global terror” through its external ’Shadow Unit’ or ‘Black Unit’. Known as ‘Unit 910’, it is one of the organization’s most secretive and dangerous branches, and falls under the command of Talal Hamiyah, also known as ’Abu Jaafar’, who is a member of the Jihad Council, Hezbollah’s top military decision-making body. This opens the possibility of monitoring Houthi elements abroad more closely if they are involved in cooperation and coordination with Hezbollah to carry out secret operations abroad. The ‘Shadow Unit’ moves between several Arab and foreign states under political, media, and other umbrellas. It is noteworthy that Hezbollah is primarily responsible for Houthi operational and funding affairs as a mediator for Iran.

The setback of Hezbollah has certainly affected Iran’s network of agents in the region, especially the Houthis. This may impact them in an ascending manner in light of their ongoing attacks in the Red Sea. There is no point currently in talking about any Saudi-led efforts to reach a ceasefire in Yemen. This is because the Houthis still open the floodgates of internal and external fighting fronts, leaving the international community faced with difficult choices. Therefore, it seems that Yemen will continue facing this political dilemma for a long time in light of these intensifying circumstances. Furthermore, the economic conditions are expected to deteriorate further in areas controlled by the Houthis and the Internationally-Recognized Government alike. This is amid the Houthi attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea, leading to a decline in maritime traffic.

Is This an Open Conflict?

It is clear that the US pressure will continue amid the Israeli euphoria after getting rid of the most prominent Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon and launching more violent and deep military actions on several axes in South Lebanon and Gaza. It seems that Israel doesn't care so much about these pressures, which come a month before the US elections. The Israelis insist on carrying out a strike that will pose a political and economic threat to the Iranian regime, which has faced deep internal problems over the past years. According to The New York Times, “damaging oil facilities in Iran could harm Iran’s already frail economy and disrupt global oil markets a month before the US elections. Iran produces about three million barrels of oil per day, or about three percent of world supply. Its biggest customer is China”. Additionally, the increasing prices of petrol, fuel, and other products threaten several economies around the world with recession, especially the poor countries. 

The level of the Israeli response or that of the countering one by Iran and its proxies in the region is so far unknown, as well as whether these mutual attacks will lead to an open conflict and a comprehensive war or not. Iran is seeking to assert its influence in the face of escalating efforts to weaken it. This is especially in light of Iran’s exclusion from the geo-economic projects and arrangements that preceded October 7, 2023. Iran will apparently continue, more intensively, on its radical path against Israel, given that the destruction of Israel is the oldest and most central demand for the Islamic Republic and its militias in the region. Likewise, despite the important tactical gains achieved by Israel, it seeks to rehabilitate its image that has been relatively shattered by Iran recently, given Tel Aviv's ongoing promotion of its limitless defense capabilities. Thus, the options will remain open to both parties, in case of further escalation or a de-escalation in the region. However, the price that either party will pay in any case will be a heavy one, including the impact on Iran’s agents, foremost of whom are the Houthis.