In any case, the Yemeni theater of the West Asian wars isn’t a priority for the US, Israel, or Russia right now, but the interplay between them and with Iran (especially Russian-Iranian bilateral ties) could lead to progress on resolving it sometime afterwards.

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Andrew Korybko (South24 Center)

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Donald Trump’s return to the White House could set the stage for major changes in West Asia if his incoming administration offers concessions to Russia for freezing the Ukrainian conflict in exchange for cooperating with its envisaged regional policy. His team would like to end the West Asian wars between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis, sustainably ensure Israel’s security in the aftermath, and then greatly reduce Iran’s regional military-strategic influence, all of which Russia can help with. 

Before describing how that could come about, it’s important to briefly review Russia’s policy towards each regional hotspot. Beginning with Palestine, it insists on implementing UNSC Resolutions in order to make progress on a two-state solution. Russia considers October 7, 2023 to be a "terrorist attack" by Hamas, but it also condemns what it describes as Israel’s collective punishment of the Palestinians afterwards. It won’t sanction either party though and has continued to engage in dialogue with both about a ceasefire. 

Russia’s talks with Hamas’ political wing are also aimed at securing the release of the remaining hostages, while the latest report about Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer’s allegedly secret trip to Russia supposedly concerned efforts to secure Moscow’s support for a ceasefire in Lebanon. The proposal that’s being floated around would include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces, Hezbollah’s withdrawal behind the Blue Line, and restricting the group’s arms imports from Iran. 

On that topic, Russian Special Presidential Envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev recently said that Iran supports his country’s ceasefire efforts, but he also said that it’s not Moscow’s duty to monitor and prevent the passage of Iranian arms to Hezbollah from Syria like Israel requested. Moving along to that Arab Republic in which its forces operate, Lavrentiev added that Russia is interested in resuming talks on Syria with the US after Trump’s inauguration. As for Yemen, Russia plans to reopen its embassy, albeit in Aden instead of Sanaa. 

That’s a significant development since it suggests that prior reports about Russia arming the Houthis aren’t true because it’s difficult to imagine Moscow reopening its embassy in the country’s interim capital Aden if it planned to arm the Iran-backed militia against the Internationally Recognized Government there. Even so, despite growing ties with that same government, Russia has yet to involve itself all that much in the political process for ending Yemen’s already decade-long conflict. 

Having briefly reviewed Russian policy towards West Asia, it’s now time to look at how Russia can help the US effect major changes there if the right incentives are offered in Ukraine, chiefly those that align with its goals to demilitarize that country, “denazify it” (as Moscow terms it), and restore its constitutional neutrality (which existed till Kyiv in 2019 abandoned its neutral status following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and started leaning toward joining the EU and NATO, provoking Russia). These factors would be required to bring Russia on board with the US’ plans to end these wars, sustainably ensure Israel’s security, and contain Iran. 

As regards Palestine and Lebanon, which can be interconnected at this point, Russia is a permanent member of the UNSC whose approval would have to be required to pass associated resolutions on them. Moscow’s role in resolving the first-mentioned conflict (Ukraine) is purely political, but the second one (in Lebanon) could be military-strategic due to its influence over Syria, which Russia might convince to crack down on Hezbollah’s arms. For as far-fetched as that might sound, it still can’t be ruled out for the reasons that’ll now be explained. 

Trump’s nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as his Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the US’ entire Intelligence Community, could lead to a fundamental rethinking in America’s approach to Syria. She’s considered to be in favor of President Bashar Assad’s continued leadership of the country after meeting with him twice during a congressional trip there in 2017. Gabbard has also harshly criticized Turkiye in the past too, particularly for its support of what she describes as "terrorist groups", including in Syria. 

Robert F. Kennedy Jr, Trump’s nominee to lead the Department of Health and Human Services, recently said that the returning president wants to pull US troops out of northeastern Syria where they presently support Kurdish militants who control the bulk of the country’s oil. He tried to do so during his first term, but it didn’t work out due to fierce opposition from his military leaders. Things might be different this time around though due to changing global circumstances and internal political dynamics. 

This background sets the stage for segueing into what the US could do to facilitate Russia’s potential efforts to convince Syria to go along with the proposal for monitoring and preventing the passage of Iranian arms to Hezbollah across its territory. Syria is desperate for sanctions relief and also detests the US’ continued occupation of its northeastern oil-rich region. So, the first would have to be lifted, even if only in phases per compliance with the aforesaid proposal, while the second would have to withdraw. 

Sanctions relief is the easier of the two since the Republicans will control the executive and legislative branches next year, while the second entails the risk that Turkiye might launch another military operation against what Ankara deems to be "Kurdish terrorists" who threaten its territorial integrity. It’s already carried out several such operations thus far and occasionally threatens to launch another one, so this isn’t a fringe scenario. It can, however, potentially be averted through close Russian-US cooperation. 

The US-backed Kurdish groups administer an autonomous polity that doesn’t want to lose its political rights in the event that it comes back under Damascus’ writ. At the same time, Damascus doesn’t recognize their polity nor the legitimacy of their aspirations, but credible promises of phased sanctions relief by the US might help Russia get it to reconsider. In parallel with that, interest in the Russian-written Syrian draft constitution from 2017 might also be revived, which could pave the way for a lasting settlement. 

After all, constitutional changes would be required to incorporate this autonomous polity into the presently unitary Arab Republic, and any such moves in that direction could possibly lead to formal autonomy or some other type of special status for the Turkish-occupied Islamist northwest. Even if an agreement can’t be reached between Damascus and Ankara for resolving that dimension of this conflict, the replacement of US forces in the northeast with Russian-Syrian ones could deter another operation. 

What’s most important for Damascus is rebuilding the country, which isn’t possible without sanctions relief and regaining control over its oil deposits in the northeast, and this requires reaching a deal with the US that could be aided by Syria agreeing to stop the Iranian-Hezbollah arms trade across its territory. Such a move would be considered a betrayal by the Iranian-led Resistance Axis, however, unless Iran’s ruling “moderate”/“reformist” government reaches its own deal with the US and indirectly with Israel. 

It was just reported that Elon Musk, whose social media platform X played a key role in Trump’s electoral victory and will be closely advising the returning president, met with Iran’s Ambassador to the UN to discuss defusing tensions. Unnamed Iranian sources were quoted as describing their talks as “positive” and “good news”. Trump’s reported desire to renew his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran by tightening sanctions against it might be sufficient for coercing some regional concessions from it. 

Of course, the ruling “moderate”/“reformist” Iranian government’s rivals from the “hardliner”/“principalist” camp could always sabotage that, such as if the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) unilaterally strikes Israel; but the point is that there’s a possibility for de-escalation and interconnected regional deals if the political will exists. Russia’s role in any arrangement would be in convincing Syria and Iran of the need to engage in dialogue with the US in good faith, particularly for promised sanctions relief, and it could offer suggestions too. 

In parallel with trying to convince Syria to stop the Iranian-Hezbollah arms trade across its territory in exchange for American concessions in Ukraine, Russia can also work on restoring security along the disputed Golan Heights, in which President Vladimir Putin previously cooperated with Trump. That was back in 2018, however, and a lot has happened since. If there’s a political breakthrough, then Russia could again help remove Iranian forces from there like it did in the past, which Putin talked about here. 

Moreover, Article 8.2 of the previously mentioned Russian-written draft constitution for Syria that was shared in early 2017 would see Damascus “denounce war as an infringement on other countries’ sovereignty and a means to resolve international conflicts” if at least that part is ever agreed to. In other words, the Golan Heights dispute would remain frozen pending a Syrian-Israeli political resolution, which would remove the pretext that Iran and its allies have relied on to threaten Israel from there. 

What Russia might request of Syria – blocking the Iranian-Hezbollah arms trade across its territory, recognizing the Kurds’ autonomous polity, and forswearing war with Israel over the Golan Heights – are enormous concessions that Damascus might ultimately refuse no matter what Moscow says or does. The chances of its acquiescence would rise though if the US undertakes two of its own concessions – withdrawing from the northeast and promising phased sanctions relief – that Russia could help broker. 

All of this would be facilitated by whatever progress Musk might make in defusing tensions between the US and Iran, with promises of investment from the world’s richest man serving as the carrot to the stick of Trump’s expected “maximum pressure” sanctions policy. Russian encouragement could also go a long way. To be sure, this sequence of events probably won’t play out perfectly, if at all. There’s a lot that could go wrong, such as Turkiye intervening in Syria once again or the IRGC unilaterally striking Israel. 

Nevertheless, Russia could play a key role in catalyzing the crucial Syrian aspect of this sequence, but only if it’s incentivized to do so by the credible promise of concessions in Ukraine. In the event that at least part of this sequence unfolds and major changes do indeed occur in West Asia, then it could have a positive residual effect on Yemen, which remains on the periphery of everyone’s attention. This is in spite of the Houthis shutting down most Euro-Asian traffic through the neighboring waterways for a year now. 

As it turns out, the global economy has accepted the longer transport times and higher costs, while the US lacked the will to flex its muscles at the level required to break the Houthi blockade. For that, it’ll take more than just strikes, and there’s no appetite in America for a ground intervention. Not even Trump is expected to go that far. He might ramp up strikes as part of his “maximum pressure” policy, more sanctions on Iran could weaken the Houthis with time, or a deal with Iran could defang them to a degree, but that’s it. 

An Israeli ceasefire with Hamas and/or Hezbollah, especially with both, could lead to the Houthis ending their blockade since they claimed to be carrying it out in solidarity with their Resistance Axis allies. In any case, the Yemeni theater of the West Asian wars isn’t a priority for the US, Israel, or Russia right now, but the interplay between them and with Iran (especially Russian-Iranian bilateral ties) could lead to progress on resolving it sometime afterwards. Its own two-state plan is the most sustainable solution. 

That’s still a far way off though since there the regional conditions would have to change first, namely a resolution of the other West Asian wars (Israel-Palestine and Israel-Lebanon) in order for global attention to then shift back to Yemen sometime afterwards. A lot would also depend on whether Iran is strengthened or weakened depending on the outcome of the aforementioned two conflicts. Syria’s possible role in helping to resolve the Israeli-Lebanese one will determine that to a large extent. 

Wrapping everything up, Russia appears ready to play a role in resolving the West Asian wars, but only if the right incentives are offered in Ukraine first, otherwise it’ll likely let everything unfold as it will. In fact, cynically speaking, it might not even mind if they continue indefinitely so long as they remain manageable in the sense of avoiding a larger conflict between Israel and Iran since they distract the US from Ukraine somewhat. At the very least, more American aid to Israel might lead to less aid to Ukraine. 

That being said, Russia’s grand strategic goal is to build a new global order that ensures its interests a lot better than the current one does, ergo why it would likely cooperate with the US in West Asia as much as is realistically possible given the limits that were described if the US is sincerely interested in this. It’s therefore not for naught that Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski recently quipped that “Potsdam-type decisions are in the air” that “could establish a new international order for decades.” 

What’s eventually agreed to between Russia and the US in Europe might be largely influenced by whatever they may or may not agree to in West Asia. The US has vested interests in sustainably ensuring Israel’s security once the regional wars end as well as containing Iran, both of which Russia can help it achieve so long as it agrees to convince Syria to do what was suggested. Damascus might still refuse to do any of this, but it could also be incentivized by the carrots that were proposed. 

All in all, there’s indeed a unique opportunity to build a new global order in the aftermath of the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine and the West Asian wars between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis, but that requires Russia and the US cooperating pragmatically to this end. Whether major changes or more of the same follows will depend on how successful their diplomats are in working together and with their respective Syrian/Iranian and NATO/Israeli partners to reach such a deal.