A tougher stance on the Houthis would also be welcomed by many Yemenis who oppose the international community’s legitimization of Houthi rule in Yemen, including the recent Saudi appeasement of the Houthis and the imposition of the controversial peace roadmap.

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Ala Mohsen (South24 Center)

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Introduction

The return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office is expected to bring significant changes to US foreign policy, given the stark contrasts between Trump and Biden on many issues including how to respond to Middle East developments and ensure American national security. Yemen has become increasingly entangled in the region’s turmoil, especially following the eruption of hostilities in Gaza on October 7, 2023. The Houthis have openly aligned themselves with the resistance against Israel, declaring that they will continue their attacks until Israel halts its military operations in Gaza. This in turn has deepened Yemen's involvement in the broader regional dynamics, escalating tensions within an already fragile local context. While the US has established an international task force (Operation Prosperity Guardian) to protect international shipping in the Red Sea and the surrounding waters, it has failed to deter the Houthis from continuing their course.

Arab and Muslim Americans have made peace in the Middle East a central demand in their support for Donald Trump’s bid for presidency. Yemeni-American Imam Belal Al-Zuhairi, for example, justified Muslims’ endorsement of Trump because he promised to end the war in the Middle East and Ukraine. While Trump himself has given a good ear to these demands, some rightfully suspect it as a mere electoral campaign ploy that aims at gaining voter support without translating into actionable policy during office. For Yemenis and others invested in Yemen's affairs, the pressing question is whether a shift in US leadership could "stir the stagnant waters", potentially helping to end the decade-long civil war or, conversely, escalating actions against the Houthis to weaken their control.

The Trump Doctrine

In order to predict how the new administration will deal with the Yemeni crisis, we have to dig deeper into the Trump doctrine to understand his foreign policy preferences. Two aspects define this Trump doctrine: America first and transactionalism. America first means prioritizing US national interests over globalist agenda or human rights concerns. Unlike the Biden administration, human rights violations and dire humanitarian conditions in the country are less likely to motivate Trump for action. Trump also sees politics as a series of deals and transactions. His foreign policy will therefore be guided by immediate, tangible benefits rather than ideology or long-term strategy. 

Trump’s first presidency (2017-2021) provides good insights into how his new administration will respond to the Houthis. Before leaving office, Trump designated the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a decision reversed by the Biden administration after taking over. The Biden administration also suspended offensive arms sales to Saudi Arabia, blaming it for producing Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. While these measures were justified politically as efforts to ameliorate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, they also helped to end the Houthis’ isolation and strengthened their position. Although the Biden administration re-designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization (in Feb 2024), it is likely that Trump will adopt a more aggressive approach against the Houthis, imposing harsher measures aimed at choking the group politically and financially.

External Influences on Trump

Regional powers play a decisive role in formulating Trump’s Yemen policy and driving possible escalation against the Houthis. In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has significantly influenced bipartisan US foreign policy toward Yemen, making it a subset of US-Saudi relations rather than an independent policy sphere. This way, the Saudis managed to get the Democratic former President Barack Obama to endorse their war in Yemen in 2015. The first Trump administration also continued to support Saudi-led coalition operations against the Houthis throughout the term. With the wholehearted backing of the Trump administration, the Saudis prioritized military victory over a political solution with the Houthis. However later, in the backdrop of the dismal performance of Yemen’s Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), the loss of US support during the Biden administration and the pressure from transnational human rights groups over the humanitarian situation in Yemen finally compelled the Saudis to change their policy from staunch opposition to acceptance of Houthis as a de-facto authority, at least in the areas they control. With Trump back to office, there is little reason for Saudi Arabia to continue to appease the group that they neither like nor trust.

Despite its official withdrawal in 2019, the UAE still has some high stakes in the Yemeni conflict. It has maintained its opposition to empowering the Houthis and has even lobbied openly to redesignate the Houthis as terrorist organization after the Biden administration revoked their terrorist designation in February 2021. Additionally, the UAE continues to support local forces in Yemen, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the National Resistance led by Tariq Saleh, to prevent the Houthis from making more territorial gains in the country. This sustained involvement reflects the UAE's broader strategy to counter radical Islamist groups, safeguard the maritime routes and counter Iranian influence in Yemen. These objectives align well with the Trump-led US vision for the region. 

Alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Israel has recently emerged as a third external party concerned about the expansion of Houthi influence in Yemen and the region, with a clear interest in weakening the group and reducing its influence. Following the Gaza war, the Houthis have launched multiple missile and drone attacks, targeting Israeli cities as well as its commercial interests in international waters. In retaliation, Israel launched multiple airstrikes targeting Hodeidah and other locations within Houthi-controlled areas, marking its first overt military intervention in Yemen. The strong ties between Trump and his close associates with Israel means that the new US administration would likely offer unwavering support for further Israeli operations against the group, especially that the US and the UK have also carried out strikes against Houthi targets, aiming to degrade the group's capabilities to attack Red Sea cargo ships.

A Tougher Position Against the Houthis 

Given Trump’s hostile position on the Houthis and his close relationship with the three key regional players (Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel), we are likely to see a shift back to a more confrontational approach targeting Iran and its regional allies and proxies as part of his broader “maximum pressure” policy. In Yemen particularly, this means expanding military operations under “Operation Prosperity Guardian” and intensifying sanctions against Houthi leaders. Since Trump’s last term, the Houthis have significantly grown in their military capabilities, with access to advanced missile systems, drones, and naval mines that have increasingly threatened international trade and regional security. To counterbalance the Houthis, Trump would likely increase support for Yemeni forces, including Southern forces, to bolster their capacity to stand against the increasing Houthi incursions.

A tougher stance on the Houthis would also be welcomed by many Yemenis who oppose the international community’s legitimization of Houthi rule in Yemen, including the recent Saudi appeasement of the Houthis and the imposition of the controversial peace roadmap. The anti-Houthi coalition, which includes the IRG, the STC, National Resistance and Islah, will find new opportunities to bolster their position amidst Trump’s return to the White House. In anticipation of potential changes in US policy, STC president Aidarous Al-Zubaidi has been meeting with a number of foreign diplomats to rally international support against the Houthi threat. Also, despite the historical rivalry between the Southern Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Zubaidi recently met with Islah Party’s leaders. This indicates a pragmatic shift in the anti-Houthi coalition to set aside their differences and leverage the change in the White House to secure broader international support against the Houthis.

While the resumption of the Hodeidah offensive is still a possibility given the new wave of terrorist designation of the Houthis by several Western countries, none of the involved parties including the US and other regional powers are interested in triggering a full-scale war against the Houthis. After all, the Houthis are going to strike inside Saudi Arabia and the UAE if they face military pressure from the United States, especially that they regard these countries to be instruments of American and Israeli imperialism in the region. For this reason, the imminent escalation will be limited to targeted operations aimed at weakening the Houthi military capabilities to bring them back to the negotiation table. So far, the Houthis have felt emboldened due to the incompetence of the IRG and the desire of its regional backers to exit the war and to reach a fast deal with the Houthis. Perceiving these weaknesses, the Houthis do not feel ready for peace yet, as they can still secure more concessions through war.

Final Thoughts

While the US will not necessarily claim a leading role in the Yemeni crisis, the return of President Donald Trump to office provides a conducive environment similar to the early years of the regionalized civil war in Yemen. A US hardline policy against Iran and its regional proxies would likely translate into intensified efforts to undermine the Houthis’ political and military power. However, it is also unlikely that Trump would invest substantial US forces to fight the Houthis in Yemen. Rather, he would rely on regional allies and Yemeni forces to take the lead in executing strategies aimed at countering the Houthis and reducing Iranian influence in the country. This delegation and involvement of regional actors and local partners reflects Trump’s broader approach of reducing direct US military involvement overseas while maintaining US influence through transactional partnerships. 

Finally, we cannot over-estimate the impact of the US intervention in the Yemeni crisis. While these pressures may succeed in changing the domestic balance of power in favor of the anti-Houthi coalition, they are not likely to end the multi-layered Yemeni conflict. The roots of the current civil war go back to decades of grievances and a long legacy of political manipulation, corruption and bad governance, especially in the South. Without addressing these grievances and fostering an inclusive political settlement, external pressures, including US interventions, will only provide temporary shifts in power, leaving the root causes of the conflict unresolved and undermining any prospects for long-term peace and stability.