Russia's military intelligence and diplomatic institutions, often referred to as its "deep state," are believed to consist of two distinct factions. One faction, considered moderate, aims to maintain Russia's geopolitical balancing act, while the emerging hardline faction advocates for taking decisive positions.

Dr. Andrew Korybko (South24)

CNN published a report late last week alleging that last-minute behind-the-scenes efforts by the US and especially Saudi Arabia caused Russia to abort its supposedly imminent plans to arm the Houthi militia with missiles. None of the four involved parties have commented on the matter at the time of this analysis’ publication, but some observers have linked the story to Putin’s threat in early June to arm American adversaries in response to the West arming Ukraine. 

For some observers, it seems plausible that Russia would consider arming the Houthis to perpetuate the ongoing crisis in the Red Sea, which has diverted European-Asian shipping around Africa, increased costs, and potentially created political challenges for the European Union allies of the United States. According to CNN, while the transfer ultimately did not occur, unnamed American officials claimed that Russian personnel were allegedly observed disembarking from a vessel in the Red Sea and being transported by a Houthi boat to Yemen for a three-day visit.

This aspect of the report raises questions about the nature of their activities if the information is accurate. The sources in the report suggested that the Houthis intended to conduct live-fire exercises with their Russian visitors, but this also did not materialize. Thus, it remains speculative whether any of CNN's reporting is accurate, and even if some of it is, why the anticipated developments did not unfold. If none of it is true, it raises questions about the motivations behind these claims.

The rationale behind some observers' belief in the report's plausibility can be further elaborated. Russia's military intelligence and diplomatic institutions, often referred to as its "deep state," are believed to consist of two distinct factions. One faction, considered moderate, aims to maintain Russia's geopolitical balancing act, while the emerging hardline faction advocates for taking decisive positions.

Historically, Russia has cultivated relationships with rival countries such as Iran-Israel, Iran-Saudi Arabia, and Syria-Turkey, without favoring one over the other. This approach has allowed Russia to gain mutual benefits and position itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes, should both parties express the political will for resolution. The goal is to create stability and predictability in regional affairs, reducing the risk of large-scale conflicts due to miscalculations.

The hardline faction, on the other hand, believes that Russia should align itself decisively in regional disputes, particularly by supporting Iran and its allies to destabilize the region and divert attention from Ukraine. Their influence has grown over the past two and a half years since Russia's intervention in Ukraine, which has resulted in an extended proxy conflict with the West.

Some analysts speculate that the United States aims to transform the Ukrainian conflict into a prolonged engagement, increasing pressure on Russia. To counter this, they suggest that escalating the Iranian-Israeli proxy conflict to a large-scale confrontation might force the US to push Ukraine towards accepting Putin's ceasefire proposal from mid-June, which called for Kiev's withdrawal from territories claimed by Moscow.

Arming the Houthis with missiles could be viewed as a step toward instigating a large-scale regional conflict, compelling the US, and potentially Israel, to further extend their military commitments. This could create strategic opportunities for Iran and its allies, leading to a cycle of retaliatory actions and potentially escalating into a wider conflict.

While this line of reasoning follows a certain logic, none of these developments occurred, and it remains speculative whether there were any serious plans for Russia to pursue this course of action. Assuming, for argument's sake, that there was an initial effort, it would suggest that the moderate policymakers prevailed over the hardline faction.

CNN's assertion that Saudi Arabia played a significant role in persuading Russia to reconsider these plans aligns with the possibility that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman discussed the matter with Putin during their call on July 17. The Russian leader may have contemplated the potential consequences, including the impact on Russia's relations with OPEC+ and Saudi Arabia, before deciding against proceeding with the plan.

If this scenario is accurate, it still does not explain the alleged three-day visit of Russian personnel to the Houthis. This part of the report may be inaccurate, or perhaps the visit involved discussions about future cooperation or efforts to reduce Houthi attacks on ships carrying Russian commodities. In late July, Bloomberg cited UK Navy statistics, indicating that 19% of the 83 maritime attacks since November targeted vessels whose most recent port of call was Russia.

Even if Russia sought to devise a mechanism with the Houthis to mitigate such attacks, it would not necessitate dispatching personnel for a three-day visit. Secure communication channels, similar to those used by Iran with the group, could have been employed without such risks.

Several arguments suggest that the report's claims may not be accurate. Firstly, Russia would risk damaging its relations with Saudi Arabia if it armed the Houthis, as the group could potentially use these weapons against the Kingdom. It is unrealistic to expect Russia to embed advisors with the Houthis to monitor the use of its missiles, as they would be prime targets for US, UK, and Israeli forces.

Additionally, arming the Houthis would jeopardize Russia's ties with Israel, which have been carefully maintained despite disagreements over Gaza. Israel has not armed Ukraine or sanctioned Russia, and Russia has not allowed Syria to use S-300s against Israel nor designated Israel as an "unfriendly country." However, Russia's UN representative warned Israel of "certain political consequences" if it supplied air defenses to Ukraine.

Given that Israel has not taken such action, it would not be logical for Russia to strain relations by providing missiles to the Houthis, which could exacerbate the Red Sea crisis or be used against Israel directly. Russia's policymakers, primarily moderates, would likely find it challenging to justify such a move to President Putin, considering the potential costs.

Furthermore, there is no certainty that arming the Houthis would provoke the large-scale regional conflict sought by the hardline faction. If Russia aimed to escalate tensions significantly, it could consider other measures, such as transferring missiles to Syria and Hezbollah through Iran's arms-trafficking networks. Not even Western media have reported such plans, adding to skepticism about the CNN report.

The logistics of sending missiles to Yemen also pose questions about why the US and Saudi Arabia would allow it without raising significant awareness during transit as a means to pressure Moscow. They would presumably transit the Red Sea, where Operation Prosperity Guardian is ongoing, making it unclear why the US would not attempt to intercept them or raise global awareness during the process.

If the Houthis acquired Russian missiles, they would pose a significant threat to US vessels participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian, as well as to America's Israeli and Saudi allies. The US cannot afford to overextend its forces, especially not by engaging in a large-scale regional conflict due to potential attacks on its ships or its allies coming under fire.

The US is planning to "pivot (back) to Asia" to more robustly counter China once the Ukrainian conflict subsides, but this strategy could be undermined if it becomes entangled in a major war in West Asia. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine why the US would not take all realistic measures to prevent what CNN's sources described as an "imminent weapons transfer," only to leak the information to the press after the threat had passed.

All these considerations lead to the conclusion that Russia likely did not intend to arm the Houthis with missiles seriously. However, it is possible that American intelligence detected some discussions within Russia's hardline faction, which may have been shared with the Saudis. In this case, there might have been some degree of diplomatic engagement by the US and Saudi Arabia to discourage Russia, but it was not an urgent threat.

In summary, it appears that Russia's moderate policymakers never seriously considered the proposal to arm the Houthi militia with missiles. However, the possibility that discussions reached the US and Saudi Arabia could explain the inconsistencies in CNN's report, which was likely produced after unnamed officials leaked some details to bolster Western morale and weaken regional support for Russia.

The speculation surrounding this report might also decrease trust in Russia among Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the Southern Transitional Council within it. They might worry about Russia’s emergent hardline policymaking faction one day usurping the moderate one’s influence on this issue. Nevertheless, this faction ultimately didn’t get what it speculatively wanted though either. 

It might be a good idea for these stakeholders to consider the merits of ramping up military-technical cooperation with it. They represent the internationally recognized government so they’d responsibly use whatever Russia might give them for upholding regional security instead of provoking a wider war and attacking more civilian ships like the Houthis might have done. 

The Houthis also can’t give the Russian Navy logistics facilities or basing rights, which is something that Moscow is seeking to obtain in the wider Gulf of Aden-Red Sea region, unlike the internationally recognized government. The latter could therefore enter into serious discussions with Russia about this in order to ensure that it doesn’t ever flirt with arming the Houthis again. Logistics facilities and/or basing rights trump anything that the Houthis could offer Russia. 

The first are long-term commitments that could serve as anchor projects for growing Russian investments in post-war Yemen once the conflict finally ends, while the second are agents of instability without any international legitimacy. Overall, it’s therefore much better for Russia to forget about partnering with the Houthis and to never consider this again in any semi-serious way.