We must recognize that political fragmentation is a long-standing feature of Yemen’s political culture. The current political reality in Yemen mirrors the rivalry between Aden and Sanaa in the 1970s and 1980s.

Ala Mohsen (South24) 

Introduction 

The liberation of Aden in July 2015 marked a significant turning point for South Yemenis, the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) of Hadi, and their Saudi and Emirati backers. It dealt a major blow to the advancing Houthis and pro-Saleh forces, who were overconfident in their bid to take control of the entire country. After four months of armed struggle with basic weaponry, civilian-turned fighters could finally breathe a sigh of relief, and their internally displaced families could return to their homes. 

Promises of prosperity, development, and the rule of law were set high, and people celebrated the prospect of a new era, free from the corrupt legacy of Saleh and the regressive ideology of the Houthis. Within weeks, the Bahah government returned to Aden and reestablished its presence, exercising authority from within the country and taking charge of military operations to liberate other areas. Leaders from the Southern Movement were also integrated into IRG authority structures and appointed as governors and police chiefs in recognition of their efforts in combating the Houthis. 

However, conflict between the Hadi administration and the Southern Resistance soon surfaced, culminating in the dismissal of key figures from office, including Aidrous  Al-Zubaidi and Hani Bin Bureik. In response, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was established in May 2017, signifiying a strain in the IRG-Southern Movement partnership and the marriage of convenience formed in the early phase of the war.

Political Tensions and Governance Challenges

In response to these rising tensions and competing agendas, stability and order in Southern areas were deprioritized. Worse still, a high-level official within Yemen's IRG publicly announced that stabilization would serve the “separatist” project in Aden. In other words, the Yemeni government was suspicious that efforts to normalize and improve living conditions in the South would empower their rivals at their expense. The belief was that the prevalence of chaos and despair would help to thwart the pro-independence project and isolate the STC from its support base. 

Evidently, it was not only the tactical will of the Hadi administration that perpetuated chaos. The recurring cycles of confrontations created a self-fulfilling prophecy, fostering an environment conducive to instability and violence. While the signing of the Riyadh Agreement in 2019 and the establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in 2022 helped ease much of the armed conflict between the two sides, the PLC remains far from being a coherent executive body. Ongoing internal divisions and conflicting visions undermine its ability to govern effectively. As a result, it has so far failed to curb corruption, resolve governance issues, and improve service provision in liberated areas.

Key governance-related issues facing the PLC include electricity, economic collapse, and security mismanagement. The provision of electricity has been a major source of public discontent, especially in coastal areas. During the summer, power cuts can last up to 18 hours a day, making people’s lives unbearable, particularly in regions with hot and humid climates like Aden, where summer temperatures often reach 35 to 40°C. Although the recently inaugurated UAE-funded solar power station has helped alleviate the situation, it falls short of meeting the local demand during peak summer months, which can reach 750 megawatts in Aden alone. If the government cannot meet this demand itself, it should consider also involving the private sector to help provide electricity and allocate government subsidies to bring market prices to affordable levels. 

While electricity is typically a seasonal issue, the dire economic situation and hyperinflation pose the most pressing concerns, directly impacting livelihoods. As of September 2024, the exchange rate in IRG-controlled areas is 1,915 riyals for 1 dollar, an 88% loss compared to its pre-war value. This means that a public sector employee who once earned $300 a month before 2015 now makes less than $34. For most Yemenis, affording basic necessities has become a daily struggle. Security challenges also exacerbate the hardship, including terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda, a lack of coordination between security units, and abuse of authority by certain security chiefs.

Countering the Houthis through governance? 

Houthi activities in the Red Sea have clearly shown that the group has little prospect of transforming into a responsible authority that respects international norms. The maritime threats posed by the Houthis undermine the interests of the entire world — not just specific countries like Israel or the United States, as the Houthis often claim. 

Unfortunately, the Houthis have exploited the Red Sea crisis as an opportunity to intensify repression and implement controversial policies. Even humanitarian workers have been targeted in their campaigns. Over the past few months, Houthi authorities have arbitrarily detained humanitarian workers, raided offices, including the UN headquarters, and engaged in intimidation and threats. They have also continued to impose restrictions on movement and are now meddling in the hiring processes of Sana’a-based international NGOs. Even in the most authoritarian regimes, humanitarian workers are rarely targeted, as they typically avoid the contentious politics of these countries. 

However, the Houthis' efforts to consolidate power have led to widespread harassment, increased restrictions on civil space, and the creation of a culture of fear to subjugate all elements of society into submission and compliance with their vision. The challenges posed by the Houthis' ongoing control in Sana’a and the northern regions make it imperative to work on stabilizing life in the South and other areas under the control of the IRG, especially with the war heading into a military stalemate. Those areas are generally more inclusive, with relatively higher levels of freedom, respect for human rights, and fewer restrictions on civil society. 

Aden should not be viewed merely as an interim seat of government for the IRG but also as a symbol for unity and hub for people pursuing dignity, security, and economic opportunity. Stabilizing IRG areas will certainly revitalize hope not only for South Yemenis but for all Yemenis fleeing oppression and autocratic rule in Houthi-controlled territories. Some cities, like Marib, have already become a refuge for people escaping war and oppression. However, individual cities and governorates cannot shoulder this burden alone. If the IRG succeeds in improving living conditions and elevating service provision in the areas it already controls, the potential to undermine Houthi influence remains very high.

Stabilizing territories outside of Houthi control is a common interest that should unite all factions and stakeholders; it should not be perceived as a zero-sum game among the various entities that make up the PLC. It is absurd that significant sacrifices were made to liberate these areas from the Houthis, yet efforts to establish order and economic stability remain inadequate. Many people, particularly in the southern regions, are now living in despair due to the severe conditions they face. This situation—achieving military victory but failing in governance—also raises existential questions about the rationale for resistance and the true benefits of liberation. 

Misgovernance, corruption, and chaos only breed resentment toward the political actors in control, resulting in a loss of public trust. In this environment, the Houthis could exploit social discontent and find opportunities to infiltrate these areas, especially during a time where they remain in open conflict with powerful global and regional actors such as the US, UK, and Israel. The declining performance legitimacy of the PLC and its constituent groups, including the STC, risks alienating them from the popular support that initially enabled their victory over the Houthis.

Stabilizing the South: Unfounded Fears

Political imagination is essential for reconciling the visions of the STC and other IRG national actors. Concerns that stabilizing southern areas will lead to immediate separation are both irrational and unfounded. In reality, it is the persistance of grievances and marginalization that drives radical solutions. 

Sabotage as a political strategy has consistently proven ineffective in quelling popular sentiments, even if it manages to temporarily isolate certain political actors from their support base. For example, during the 2012-2014 period, Saleh's efforts to undermine the political transition created significant challenges for the Hadi regime but did nothing to restore his power or influence. Ultimately, Saleh was killed by the very group he had once empowered as revenge against his rivals. In such a volatile political environment, controlling the chain of events is almost impossible; thus, sabotage is a high-risk venture that often backfires. 

On the other hand, focusing on resolving governance and building internal legitimacy through effective service delivery offers a far more sustainable and secure path to competing against political rivals.  Addressing the root causes of discontent and providing tangible improvements to daily life will do far more to stabilize the region than short-term political maneuvering. 

We must recognize that political fragmentation is a long-standing feature of Yemen’s political culture. The current political reality in Yemen mirrors the rivalry between Aden and Sanaa in the 1970s and 1980s, even though both entities were sovereign states at the time. However, political fragmentation should not be necessarily conflated with governance failure. We need to work with existing structures, as even the smallest authority can significantly contribute to local stability and development. 

Rather than clinging to unity rhetoric or symbolic slogans, our priority should be on addressing governance issues and allowing discussions on state structure to evolve organically from the mutual interests of local communities and regions. At the same time, the political transformation of Aden and historical South Yemen has made these regions more conducive to development and stability, taking inspiration from their GCC neighbors. The revolutionary fervor of the socialist PDRY era is long gone; today, southern leaders are more interested in regional cooperation, prioritizing economic well-being over grand political projects on the global stage.

Addressing Governance Issues: Call for Action 

Without a doubt, governance in conflict has its own set of challenges, especially during a time of fragmented authority and dwindling financial resources. However, the bigger issue lies in the entrenched system of patronage politics and clientelism, which has enriched political leaders without leaving a positive impact on everyday governance. Fighting corruption and establishing accountability are near-impossible tasks when political loyalties outweigh the technical competence or personal integrity of those who hold office. In such an environment, minimal action is taken against those who abuse their authority, as higher-ups often turn a blind eye to the misconduct of their allies.  

That said, it would be unfair to paint the picture of governance as entirely bleak. Capitalizing on good examples and success stories is equally important. For instance, land disputes have long been a significant issue, especially in Aden. In the aftermath of 1994 war, Saleh's regime began rewarding his political and military allies with land and real estate, as a token of appreciation for their support during the war. This complicated land ownership, with multiple claims on the same property or land. The 2015 war introduced a similar, chaotic dynamic, resulting in individuals holding conflicting titles for the same property. These disputes frequently escalated into armed clashes in Aden and the surrounding areas, affecting the security and peace of local neighborhoods and civilians alike. 

However, efforts to address these issues instill some hope. One example is the work of Captain Kamal Al-Halemi, Head of the Land Protection Task Force in Aden. Established in December 2021, this specialized unit has significantly contributed to a reduction in conflict, fighting, and land seizures by powerful individuals. Such examples should be celebrated, recognized, and further supported by local authorities and political leadership, setting a strong example for how governance challenges can be addressed effectively.

Concluding Remarks

While Yemenis are divided over who is responsible for this miserable state of affairs, there is broad consensus on the urgent need for reform to stabilize these areas. It is not yet too late to revive hope for a better future. A crucial first step would be to establish a mutual understanding between the IRG and STC to ensure that service provision is decoupled from politics. Such an agreement would place governance and service delivery at the forefront of the government’s agenda.

This new vision must also include a commitment to enforcing systems of accountability, recruiting capable public administrators, and moving away from patronage politics and the mentality of dividing spoils. Of all the aforementioned challenges, the economy remains the most pressing priority. Repeated Saudi bank deposits have proven ineffective in controlling inflation or preventing currency devaluation beyond the initial few days after each deposit. 

Currency manipulation, such as that employed by the Houthis, is not a viable solution either. People in Houthi-controlled areas are also struggling with hyperinflation and declining purchasing power, despite efforts to peg the old Yemeni riyal to a specific dollar value. Instead, growth-oriented economic measures should be taken, focused on boosting productivity, creating jobs, controlling financial corruption, and reducing the need for foreign aid.