The international community has not held the Houthis to the same standard as other terrorist groups, as evidenced by the revocation of their terrorist designation without seeing any positive change in behavior.

Ala Mohsen (South24 Center)

Introduction 

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Yemen has unfortunately been in the global spotlight as a hub for terrorist outfits that spread their tentacles across international borders. For many, including foreign diplomats, the first thing they were told about the country is the strong presence of Al-Qaeda, especially after the Saudi government managed to force the terror group out of its territory in late 2008 and the establishment of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen shortly after. Al-Qaeda has exploited Yemen's fragile political and humanitarian state, its security vacuum, and chronic instability to carry out its attacks abroad; that include the bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbor in 2000 that killed 17 US soldiers, the MV Limburg oil tanker attack in 2002 off the Yemen coast, and the attempted bombing of Detroit-bound Northwest Flight 253 in 2009 by a so-called suicide “underwear bomber”. In response to the growing presence of Al-Qaeda, the West, and the US in particular, has invested heavily in counter-terrorism operations in Yemen. However, despite this support, the Yemeni government has struggled to manage or contain the terrorist threat effectively.

In the early phase of counter-terrorism operations (2002–2010), Yemen under the Ali Abdullah Saleh administration was a willing but problematic partner. Besides the political instability and limited state capabilities that hindered counter-terrorism efforts, some among the high-level political leadership were also involved in manipulating terrorism to secure political gains, as testimonies from former jihadis indicate. Saleh himself used US military aid, intended for counterterrorism purposes, to bolster his own regime and suppress domestic opposition. As a result, external support for Saleh’s corrupt regime backfired as it fueled further resentment domestically. Instead of reducing terrorism, counter-terrorism operations often generated further instability, as they aimed at defeating Al-Qaeda at all costs while ignoring local sensitivities. The fatal mistakes and high collateral damage in these operations, such as the Al-Ma’jala massacre in 2009 in which the US launched Tomahawk cruise missiles on a Bedouin camp off the Yemeni coast that claimed the lives of 41 civilians, including women and children, have further contributed to public resentment against the counter-terrorism agenda in Yemen.

Terrorism: Contentious Definitions and Practical Issues

To begin with, “terrorism” is a contentious term, often used by political actors to delegitimize their rivals. The Oxford Dictionary defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims”. However, the line between unlawful and the legitimate use of violence is frequently blurred, especially in conflicts where competing narratives and justifications shape perceptions of what constitutes as “legitimate force”. In the aftermath of 9/11, as the US designated Al-Qaeda as its primary enemy, the global counter-terrorism agenda increasingly aligned with the US’ security priorities. This approach often overlooked other radical groups that were deemed useful collaborators against Al-Qaeda, although they were not fundamentally different in ideology or anti-American sentiments. 

The fact that Sunni jihadi groups have become the prototypical "terrorist" organizations does not mean that other groups are any less dangerous. However, political considerations have led Western governments to overlook or downplay the threats posed by other radical groups, often branding them as minority groups striving to secure their historical rights or seeking legitimate redress for their grievances. This selective approach reflects how political ideology can cloud objective assessments of the real risks these groups present. Ignoring these groups can create blind spots in global security strategies, as their actions can be even more destabilizing and harmful as those of more widely recognized terrorist organizations. Unfortunately, this bias in threat perception has allowed some groups to operate with impunity, further complicating efforts to address global security challenges in an even-handed manner.

Houthis and Terrorism

To speak in concrete terms, let’s consider the case of the Houthis (officially known as Ansarallah) in Yemen. When the Biden administration took office in 2021, one of its first foreign policy actions was to remove the Houthis from the list of designated terrorist organizations. The administration justified this decision as a way to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, arguing that the Houthi terrorist designation would create institutional barriers that hinder the delivery of aid to Yemenis. However, following the destabilizing Houthi activities in the Red Sea amidst the Gaza War, the US Department of State re-designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group with effect from February 16, 2024. As part of this re-designation, Washington added several Houthi leaders to its list of sanctioned individuals. In its latest update on October 2, 2024, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on one individual and three companies that have facilitated weapon recruitment to the Houthis—in order to curb the financial capabilities and arms supply of the group. 

In addition to the US designation, many experts and institutions agree that the Houthis fit the traditional definition of a terrorist group. A UN Security Council report in 2022 noted that the Houthis' systematic shelling of densely populated civilian areas distant from the front lines can be seen as acts aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, which is prohibited under international humanitarian law. The Panel of Experts highlighted numerous instances of violent, oppressive actions by the Houthis that have terrorized Yemeni civilians. Other pundits such as Jonathan Schanzer and Matthew Zweig from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies also argue that ‘Houthis belong on the terror list’ and the Biden administration removed them in an effort to appease Iran.

At the official level, Mike Pompeo, former Secretary of State under the Trump administration, justified the designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) in January 2021, stating, “If Ansarallah (Houthis) did not behave like a terrorist organization, we would not designate it as an FTO and SDGT”. He also noted how the group's brutal campaigns have resulted in numerous deaths, contributed to regional destabilization, and prevented Yemenis from achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Even when the Biden administration days later revoked the terrorist designation of the Houthis, Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a press statement mentioned, “the US remains clear-eyed about Ansarallah’s malign actions and aggression, including taking control of large areas of Yemen by force, attacking US partners in the Gulf, kidnapping and torturing US citizens and many of our allies, diverting humanitarian aid, brutally repressing Yemenis in areas they control, and the deadly attack on December 30, 2020, in Aden against the cabinet of the legitimate government of Yemen.”

Counter-Terrorism in the Middle East: Rethinking an Outdated Strategy

Given the new realities and the evolving threat landscape, the US’ counter-terrorism strategy in Yemen and the wider region must be updated to address these changes effectively. The current approach has largely failed to address the evolving threats. The US-led counter-terrorism agenda, established after 2001, no longer aligns with the significant changes in global security challenges. After decades of intensive US-led counter-terrorism operations, Al-Qaeda has been considerably weakened, especially following the elimination of its founder, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011, and the neutralization of powerful regional figures like AQAP leaders Nasir Al-Wuhayshi (June 2015), Qasim Al-Raymi (January 2020) and Khalid Batarfi (March 2024). However, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq unintentionally empowered radical Shiite groups to counter the Ba’thist and other Sunni Islamist movements that resisted the occupation. Iraq's new leadership, such as former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, had close ties to some of these groups. Similarly, the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also legitimized the involvement of radical factions as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sponsored umbrella organization comprising 67 armed factions. In Yemen, the Houthis, are aligned with the so-called Iran-led Axis of Resistance, and they share the same anti-American sentiments with other terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. Unfortunately, the international security community has overlooked these red flags, likely due to their focus on confronting pre-defined enemies.

While Al-Qaeda still poses a threat to Yemen and the world, their destructive activities are eclipsed by those of the Houthis. In other words, Al-Qaeda’s influence is meager compared to the powerful control the Houthis command in Sanaa and other areas of North Yemen, where they have been the de facto authorities since the civil war began in late 2014. As a result, the Houthis have been able to consolidate their power, implementing policies that further entrench their governance and challenge both local and international efforts to stabilize the region. The Houthi’s domestic terrorism, and their violence and abuse against the Yemeni population have even surpassed those carried out by Al-Qaeda. For instance, the Houthis are the only group in Yemen that has bombed the residential homes of its rivals. Internationally, the Houthis have also targeted civilians in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and more recently, Israel. Furthermore, US intelligence sources revealed that the Houthis have been collaborating with terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

The Houthi's infamous slogan, "Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam”, clearly reflects their violent ideology. However, what makes them particularly dangerous is the fact that their rhetoric does not reflect empty threats—rather they often act on their words. Because the Houthis only thrive in conflict and violence, the group has also invested heavily in military weaponry. They currently have ballistic missiles, explosives, naval mines, and UAVs, allowing them to target overseas installations including oil refineries in the Gulf and beyond. These capabilities combined with a violent ideology make the Houthis one of the most serious security threats to Yemen, the region, and the broader international community.

The Manner also Matters: Towards a Multilateral Counter-terrorism Approach 

American unilateralism has dominated the current counter-terrorism approach, which reduced the role of national governments to mere implementers of policies set in Washington. Consequently, these governments were not treated as equal partners who jointly shape the counter-terrorism agenda in their respective countries. The US primarily defines what constitutes the most pressing terrorist threat, often disregarding the security priorities of the partner country. This approach has brought many drawbacks, as the US has been willing to do whatever it takes to completely eradicate Al-Qaeda, leading to high collateral damage, propping up corrupt political elites, and breaching national sovereignty. These actions have also fueled popular anger and provided radical groups with justification to expand. While there have been recent improvements in fostering better partnerships with local actors in counter-terrorism operations, these efforts need to be further strengthened. Empowering local stakeholders to take an active role in shaping the counter-terrorism agenda—rather than merely implementing US priorities—is essential for better security for all. In other words, counter-terrorism cannot be effective unless it is truly a shared interest between the US, regional powers (Saudi Arabia, UAE), Yemeni authorities, the local population.

Over the past decade, South Yemen has emerged as a critical battleground in the fight against terrorism. Southern forces have made significant progress in counter-terrorism operations in Abyan, Shabwa, and Hadramout governorates. The Hadrami Elite Forces were able to liberate Mukalla, capital city of Hadramout, after Al-Qaeda’s brief capture of the city in the early phase of the civil war. The most recent of these operations, Arrows of the East was able to clear the remaining AQAP strongholds in Abyan in 2022. On that occasion, a post by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) spokesperson, Salem Thabet Al-Awlaqi, equated the terrorist threats of Al-Qaeda with the Houthis, stating: “The security of the South is one and indivisible, and we cannot tolerate any Houthi or terrorist threats or breaches in any of the Southern governorates.” These efforts have been largely successful because they addressed a local demand to eliminate rogue terrorist organizations. The US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism (2022) acknowledged these achievements, stating that "STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces continued to play a notable role in counter-terrorism efforts, exercising control over significant parts of Aden and Abyan." This success provides some encouraging evidence that aligning local needs with counter-terrorism objectives leads to more effective outcomes.

Conclusions 

Let’s imagine a scenario where a known terrorist organization takes over a country by force, similar to how the Houthis captured Sanaa and large parts of North Yemen in 2014, and starts abusing civilians with excessive violence. How would the world react if it were Al-Qaeda? Most likely, a large international coalition would swiftly form to defeat the group and reclaim the seized territory, similar to what happened in Iraq and Syria in response to the rise of ISIS. While Saudi Arabia attempted to do the same in Yemen in 2015, this coalition was later weakened because many countries viewed the Houthis as political rivals rather than designated terrorists. Although the ongoing Red Sea crisis has prompted some revision in this perspective, there is still a lack of strong political will to deal with the Houthis as a serious terrorist threat despite their far superior operational capacity to inflict damage compared with Al-Qaeda or other transnational terrorist groups. Unfortunately, the international community has not held the Houthis to the same standard as other terrorist groups, as evidenced by the revocation of their terrorist designation without seeing any positive change in behavior. 

Finally, we have to keep in mind that counter-terrorism is not purely a technical matter; it operates within a sociopolitical context that can either facilitate or hinder its effectiveness. Yemen has been engulfed in violent conflict since the Houthis captured the capital and attempted to expand their control across the entire country. Unfortunately, despite good intentions and efforts to end the conflict peacefully, none of those have succeeded in moderating the Houthis. Therefore, if the Houthis continue to behave like a terrorist organization, they need to be treated as such. Terrorism, at its core, is about actions that threaten civilian lives and disrupt stability. In modern Yemeni history, no conflict has been as prolonged and destructive as the current one, driven largely by the Houthis' pursuit of power and their disregard for civilian lives and welfare. The international community must recognize the magnitude of this threat and adjust its strategies accordingly. Along these lines, counter-terrorism efforts must be properly prioritized, devoting the largest resources and efforts to counter the gravest threats first. Limiting counter-terrorism operations to fighting AQAP while overlooking the Houthi threat is like treating a minor illness while allowing a far more dangerous disease to spread unchecked.