The Houthis seek their personal interests as a movement. Giving up their conditions in favor of the Northern community will mean their end. Meanwhile, the STC represents the demands of the Southern community and it will also end if it abandons them.

---

Farida Ahmed (South24)

---

The military escalation in the Red Sea after the October 7, 2023, events in Gaza have led to the decline of the peace move in Yemen with the Houthis engaging in a maritime confrontation with the United States and Britain. Notably, this came just when Yemen was on the verge of a new phase of peace moves to stop the war through a UN-sponsored Saudi-Omani roadmap, with the latter becoming the main topic of discussions. The political parties in the legitimate camp, the Internationally-Recognized Government, weren’t convinced by the roadmap because they hadn’t been part of its talks from day one. Moreover, the roadmap has basically focused on meeting the Houthi demands. In light of that, Rashad Al-Alimi, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), asked the managers of the Central Bank and the ministries of Transport and Communications to stop their latest measures against the Houthis, according to exclusive sources who spoke to ’South24 Center‘. Al-Alimi's plan has been strongly rejected by the PLC members. This actually indicates the extent of Saudi pressure on the Internationally-Recognized Government in order to push forward Riyadh’s bipartite plan with the Houthis.

Collectively, the Internationally-Recognized Government faces key challenges within its internal domain at the political, economic, and military levels, which has hampered its ability to solve many contentious matters. Moreover, the links between each political party with a certain regional actor sometimes weakens their initial position and hinders the planning of strategic visions compatible with their main goals as a legitimate authority. This also affects the parties’ special objectives. Furthermore, the Houthi’s spiritual and material links with Iran has made them use Tehan’s aggressive strategy, starting with the local threats to the regional and international ones lately. This has increased the level of complexities toward the peace path in Yemen. 

Discussing the Houthi military escalation by regional and international parties is a must. However, this shouldn’t mean ignoring the urgent need to parallelly discuss South Issue which has fundamental importance to achieve sustainable peace in Yemen. This is particularly because South Issue has become a central one. Ignoring discussing such a deep underlying issue will lead to bigger problems that won’t be limited to the political parties, but extend to the streets in South which are ready to explode at any moment. 

This analysis looks at the visions of the Yemeni parties and their terms for peace. It explains the position and prospects of each party if the peace efforts are resumed. It highlights the impact of these visions on South Issue and if it is important to take into consideration the conditions of local communities or political parties in South and North for a sustainable peace in Yemen.

The Evaluation of Multiple Visions for Peace

In April 2022, the PLC was established including eight members. It serves as the Internationally-Recognized Government and is the only current legitimate party in the Yemeni equation. This came after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-sponsored Riyadh Consultations paved the way for a proper environment for political power transfer following 10 years of the rule of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. On the other hand, the Houthis have remained a coup party. This part of the analysis will evaluate every party of the peace process and the impact of their visions on South Yemen as detailed below:

First: The Southerners

Since it was founded in May 2017, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) has drawn up a number of principles and set strategic goals. They can be summarized as “completion of liberating land from the invading and occupation forces; mobilizing the national capabilities for managing land; rebuilding and activating the civil state institutions; achieving administrative, financial, and political independence from Sanaa; drafting documents and programs for building the new independent civil South state. etc”. The STC considers these principles and goals as abiding aims from which it can’t deviate. This is despite the fact that the STC is a legitimate authority and part of the Internationally-Recognized Government in Yemen. The latter’s most prominent goal along with the Saudi-led Arab Coalition is to restore Sanaa and the Northern governorates controlled by the Houthis.

Basically, the STC derives its strength from the peaceful Southern Movement (known as Hirak) that began in 2007 and from the Southern Resistance that was launched in 2015 and liberated South Yemen from the Northern forces. As a big political entity in South Yemen enjoying considerable popularity, the STC has been able to sign a strong social contract with the people. This has distinguished it from other political parties, including the Northern ones. It is somewhat ironic that this relationship with the people constitutes a big dilemma for the STC. This is because the latter will face massive pressure from its supporters if it gives any form of concessions that don’t guarantee justice for South Issue or achieve its promised main goals.

“Unity” and “disengagement” are considered a very complicated issue for all Yemeni parties. It has political dynamics that affect the stances and alliances of different actors. Proposing “disengagement” from the North by large sections of Southerners as a condition for peace makes it possible for the emergence of variable alliances that may redraw the map of the conflict in Yemen. For example, some Northern parties may ally with the STC against the Houthis. However, the peace conditions related to the Yemen unity may affect these alliances. This may push some Northern parties to ally with the Houthis against the STC. Some Northerners believe that keeping the Yemeni unity requires strong centrality, especially if peace negotiations don't fairly take into consideration the framework related to South Issue or the aspirations of Southerners. As some Northern parties seek to keep the unity at any cost, they may give concessions that will even destabilize the idea of autonomous regions and legitimize a Houthi-ruled Northern domination over South Yemen.

Large sections of Southerners believe that peace won’t be attained without the “disengagement”. Some Southerners believe that finding a fair solution for South Issue will help achieve peace. In both cases, if the Southerners don’t feel any commitment by the international community, especially UN Envoy Hans Grundberg, toward achieving their demands, they won’t recognize any possible agreement, which may constitute a real threat that could exacerbate the crises to levels beyond the outbreak of the latest conflict. At the level of expressions, many Southerners are still sensitive toward the term “self-determination” as a Southern solution for peace. For example, STC President and PLC Vice President, Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, has faced a wave of wide criticism due to his statements in an interview regarding resorting to ballot boxes to resolve the matter of South Yemen’s right to independence. Many critics insist that “disengagement” from North is the solution, and that the unity with North in 1990 wasn’t a result of the referendum or ballot boxes. This is considered another problem in itself along with the main political issue.

Southern researcher and academic Dr. Saeed Al-Jariri raises an essential and pivotal question about the identity of Southerners upon which the conditions for sustainable peace can be determined. He told “South24 Center” that “the war may be halted through a settlement or a deal based on regional and international perceptions. However, the war won't end if the real reasons are still in place or are being revolved around.”

He added: “If Southerners belong to South Yemen, the peace conditions should be compatible with the visions of certain forces in the correspondent North Yemen. If they are outside the Yemeni political identity, the peace conditions will be different, leading to a different path.” He added: ”The root of the problem goes back to erasing the independence of South from its national content in 1967, when the independent state used the identity of a neighboring country. Therefore, the explosive issues of the neighboring country haunted the state. Thus, the idea of Yemeni unity emerged as a central goal. The South state fell into the hands of a ruling tribe in Sanaa in 1990. This is like the downfall of Sanaa into the hands of a dynastic group in 2014. The Houthis have no problem regarding the Yemeni political identity like other parties, including the Socialist Party.”

According to Al-Jariri, the Southerners who support a second independent state project, should consider the first one to build an agreed-upon country on the basis of a Southern federation that takes into account the nature and privacy of the entity from Al-Mahra to Aden. Thus, they will be an influential actor to achieve the peace conditions in the Yemen issue and meet the main term of the peace in South Yemen. This can be made through real independence, that deviates from a political ideological myth that has been imposed and asserted until it has become a current and future plague against South. The myth has also hindered the neighboring Yemen (North) from seeing and confronting its own problems. Therefore, its forces escaped toward South as the issue that can unite them to gain more power and wealth. They lean on a fake historical right to which the Houthis later added the divine right to dominate South Yemen, land and people.” 

“The Houthis currently lack a soft power front that can impact a large segment of Northerners to remove the massive deposits inside the Northern mind about the unity issue that has been imbued with sanctity. The Northern political speech has leaned upon it as being a sacred issue that should be defended by force and fighting such as the slogan ’Unity or Death‘. Parallelly, the Southerners can convince the international community that including South Issue in the peace process is less costly than eliminating it. This only requires changing the methodology adopted by regional and international sponsors who were previously convinced that pressuring Southerners to rule it out is easier than convincing Northerners to include it without taking into consideration the ramifications behind this”.

Second: The Northerners:

A- The Houthis

Given the Houthi vision for peace, the matter isn’t limited to unity but to the religious group’s fanaticism about its race and placing an aura of sanctity on it. It is a more complicated matter than unity itself. Over more than a decade of conflict, the Houthis haven’t demonstrated any inclination to abandon these ideas. This would stir deep worry regarding the future of citizenship equality under their rule. A long paper, issued by ’South24 Center‘, has addressed the danger of making peace with the Houthis due to their adopted hierarchical and racial ideas. It warned that such a fragile peace may heighten injustice and lead to new waves of violence in the country.

At this point, it can be said that the Houthi insistence on maintaining conditions that carry racial privileges will threaten the rest of the political parties and the local communities in Yemen. This will especially be the case if the parties accept engaging with the group in the political process without the Houthis acceptance of citizenship equality conditions and abandoning their racial superiority ideas. This is because any “national unity government”, that would be formed after signing peace, won’t be able to oppose the Houthis who have a de facto security control over Sanaa. This will accordingly pose an increased threat by the religious group that may control areas out of their grip. This is based on the fact that the Houthis will be part of a new government if it is formed. In such a scenario, the Southerners will face three main dilemmas with North -- the current disengagement problem, the citizenship equality conflict, and sharing power and wealth.

If we draw a slight comparison between the Houthis and the STC in the different paths of peace adopted by each party, it can be said that the Houthis negotiate for themselves as a movement seeking to achieve their special interests and expanding their political and military influence beyond the society on which they tighten their grip. If the Houthis give up their particular position in favor of the conditions of the community they claim to represent, they will end as a movement. Meanwhile, the STC introduces itself as a representative of the community in South Yemen through representing the demands and aspirations of the street and negotiating for them. If new demands are imposed on the STC at the expense of the society they look after, it will end as a political entity. This disparity in approach will lead to a fundamental difference in the nature of conditions put forth by each party on the negotiation table. Moreover, this situation stirs questions about the possibility of achieving fair and comprehensive peace amid such disparity in goals and visions.

B- The Muslim Brotherhood

The Islah Party is the strongest Islamic faction linked ideologically to the Muslim Brotherhood. This raises questions about to what extent it is close to the Houthi peace conditions, especially what is related to the unity issue. Through historical stances, the Islah Party has been firmly stuck to the unity matter. Some even believe that this unity represents a sacred value for the party and may sometimes be superior to citizenship equality. This adherence was clear in 1994 when the Islah Party partnered with the Yemeni regime in a war against the Southerners, based on inflammatory religious calls and takfiri fatwas. This behavior raises concerns that the Islah Party may hinder the peace efforts in Yemen if the agenda includes South Issue. This requires an accurate analysis of its stances and motives.

It is important to state that delivering provocative religious speeches, adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen against the South’s demands, is one of the most prominent obstacles in the political scene, especially since it is related more to a religious state than being derived from just a political context. The religious movements (Houthis and Islah), despite their different doctrines, are known for supporting each other at many junctures. This is a point of agreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Houthis in the peace issue in Yemen. Accordingly, abandoning the inflammatory religious speeches against the Southerners by the Islah is very important in building peace moves. It will be easy to convince other Northern parties that South Issue is a political one that has no relationship with the religious constants and sanctities. Without neutralizing the inflammatory religious speech against South, this won’t ultimately lead to peace

C- Other Northern Parties

The Northern political parties that deviate from the framework of religious constants adopted by the Houthis and the Muslim Brotherhood constitute an opportunity to attain the peace requirements in Yemen for regional and international parties. This importance is attributed to some factors, the most important of which is the absence of grassroot pressure. Contrary to the STC, these parties don’t face popular pressure that can hinder their ability to reach compromises to attain peace. Furthermore, the flexibility of interests doesn’t restrict these parties due to religious convictions or sanctities. This makes them more open to negotiations or giving concessions to achieve their interest, even if in the case of fragile peace. Additionally, any political settlement that can be reached is considered an opportunity for these parties to obtain guarantees at all levels, especially at the individual one. 

None of the other local parties or even the regional and international parties are disturbed by this vision. This is despite the presence of political rivals to PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi for example, and also the PLC Vice President Tariq Saleh. This is due to their heavy political legacy which is part of the inheritance of the current conflict in Yemen. In light of the absence of candid observations of both these parties and through some declared stances at least, they may not pose a threat to other Northern parties. However, they can constitute a future threat to the Southerners, due to their adherence to the concept of unity and solving South Issue as part of this project.

As for the independent political parties, Yemeni academic and researcher Dr. Mansur Al-Qudsi told ‘South24 Center’ that the first step to meet the peace terms in Yemen is “the presence of honest desire by the Yemeni entities, foremost of whom are the Houthis, to attain the success of negotiations and avoid unrealistic ambitions whose failure was proven by the war 10 years ago. This aims to reach a consensus about realistic and fair solutions that address the reasons of the war and fulfill the Yemenis’ aspirations for building a civil state that ensures citizenship equality and respects rights and freedoms.”

He said that they look at attaining peace “through comprehensive disarmament applied to all entities and handing the weapons over to an agreed-upon military and security leadership to rebuild the military and security bodies at national and professional bases, away from any sectarian, regional, or partisan loyalties”.

A Mere Signature or Attaining Peace?

Yemen's neighboring regional countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Oman, insist on resuming negotiations with the Houthis according to their requirements while ignoring the peace visions of other political parties, particularly the Southerners who consider South Issue a pivotal one in the conflict. Many warn that ignoring it may lead to a new conflict. Despite the efforts of the UN envoys to Yemen at all stages, starting from Jamal Benomar to Hans Grundberg, they used to talk about peace as part of their tasks that would be achieved and not as an achievement for the Yemeni people. As soon as a peace agreement is signed, the task of the UN Envoy will end and the political parties will start a new conflict, due to the narrow-minded UN peace vision.

It can be said that the international community is more keen on signing a peace agreement in Yemen than attaining it. This is a big problem in itself. All political parties in Yemen aspire for stopping the war and reaching a comprehensive peace process. However, this depends on the design of the roadmap itself. Will it take into consideration the conditions of all parties? Will it be limited to the positions of the most influential parties? Will it take into account or ignore the terms of the local communities that are at variance with the conditions of those who control them?

The humanitarian and economic deterioration has led to a massive amount of frustration among the Yemeni people whose hopes have been crushed. Many of them have lost trust in the local, regional, and international parties, including the UN and its envoys, whose efforts have been limited to the Houthis and come too late, and they have so far failed at accomplishing any remarkable achievement to start a serious peace process. 

Regional and international parties that insist on signing any form of peace should consider the local communities’ demands and interests in the North and South. They shouldn’t merely take into account the terms of negotiations of those who seek their own interests and power. This is because any fragile peace, which is limited to protecting the negotiators while ignoring the interests of the society with just a signature, won’t achieve sustainable and fair peace in Yemen and will lead to more chaos and conflicts. This also will mainly impact the neighboring states that reveal deep strategic defects. Moreover, this will threaten the interests of the international community in the region, including maritime navigation.