Predatory behavior in Yemen is directly responsible for increased conflict across the country. As factions like the Houthis continue to rely on violence to control resources and populations, this sparks resentment among the general population.

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Ala Moshen (South24 Center)

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Introduction: What is a Predatory State? 

 

Among the political philosophies that talk about the origins of governments and states, social contract theory has been foundational in shaping modern political thought. The idea that governments are created through a voluntary agreement among free individuals to ensure collective protection and societal well-being has been influential in developing the political institutions especially in liberal democratic states. According to Hobbes, government is a necessary evil against man’s state of nature where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. In this perspective, a contractual state acts as a provider of public goods and services in exchange for the citizens’ obedience to the law and giving up some of their freedoms and liberties. However, in autocratic states, the idea of a social contract seems absurd because the benefits that citizens can reap from erection of governments are minimal. Instead, the state engages in predatory, coercive, and extractive practices to serve the private interests of powerful elites, such as politicians, the military, business class, or other influential actors, at the expense of the general populace. 

This concept of a predatory state is especially relevant in fragile contexts as it accurately captures what is happening in a significant number of failing states (Yemen included), where predatory rulers prioritize resource extraction over public goods provision. Predatory states are those where ruling elites exhibit these three defining features. First, they exploit state resources for the personal gain of the ruling elite, treating public assets as private property instead of managing them for the benefit of all. Second, they weaken or capture state institutions like the armed forces and the judiciary, using them to serve the interests of a select few while leaving the broader public unprotected. Third, the predatory elites focus on short-term gains, prioritizing “fast gains” over long-term societal development, which explains why we observe underinvestment in critical areas like education, infrastructure, and healthcare in these states. The pervasiveness of predatory behavior entrenches corruption, weakens public institutions, and perpetuates cycles of exploitation, making the state perpetually incapable of addressing the needs of its citizens or maintain a minimum level of public welfare.

Manifestations of Predatory Behavior in Yemen 

Yemen’s modern political history has been rife with predatory practices of its ruling elites. Even during periods of relative stability, such as that under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990-2012), rampant government corruption and mismanagement of public institutions caused widespread frustration among the public. However, since 2014, the civil war has provided fertile ground for various actors to intensify these predatory behaviors to unprecedented levels. While experts of Yemen often talk about authority fragmentation and the existence of two parallel governance systems (one based in Sana’a and the other based in Aden) as the most central issue facing the country, we should be more alarmed by the proliferation of predatory behaviors by those controlling the state. Many larger historical countries and empires have disintegrated without affecting the quality of everyday governance and economic well-being of citizens. For this reason, we should exert more effort to address the deeper issue of predatory behavior, starting with deliberations and policy discussions with the relevant stakeholders.

Among the various actors holding significant political power in the country, the Houthis demonstrate the most extreme case of predatory behavior. Since they stormed the capital Sana’a in September 2014, the group has actively sought to take full control of state institutions and align them with their own political and ideological interests. One of the most vital of these institutions is the Yemen Central Bank in Sana'a, which has allowed Houthis to control monetary policy in their regions, take control of state revenues, and direct them into their war effort. Despite their control, the Houthis have failed to pay public sector employees' salaries, except in partial and intermittent amounts. The group is even willing to sabotage viable national economic resources if they cannot control them themselves. For instance, the Houthis targeted oil loading terminals in the south in November 2022, effectively shrinking the Internationally Recognized Government’s (IRG) revenues and deepening the economic suffering of ordinary Yemenis. 

So far, the Houthis have used three main predatory strategies to secure their grip on political institutions and economic resources. First, they have imposed higher taxes and levies on businesses, remittances, ports and state fees including public schools, generating additional revenue to fund their war efforts and maintain control over local populations. Second, the Houthis have also been engaged in the confiscation of private property and the seizure of homes of political opponents or those unwilling to cooperate, redirecting these assets to loyalists. Third, as the de facto authority, the Houthis have also manipulated humanitarian aid, skimming supplies and tightly controlling its distribution to reward loyalists and punish rivals. 

Evidently, the Houthis are not the only actors in Yemen who engage in predatory practices, as predation and corruption runs deeper across the entire political elite. The IRG squanders the dwindling state revenues on favor exchanges and buying loyalties, rather than improving public services. For instance, a UN Sanctions Monitoring Committee Report of 2021 mentioned that officials associated with the Government of Yemen were involved in money laundering and corruption, diverting $423 million from a Saudi deposit to traders, which, in turn, affected access to food supplies for Yemeni civilians. The same report mentions other predatory practices such as manipulation of the foreign exchange rate for quick profits, preferential treatment of select corporations such as the UAE-headquartered Hayel Saeed Anam Group and the illegal use of state resources for private gain. Finally, much like the Houthis, certain personnel at government checkpoints and ports impose unauthorized fees, with proceeds often diverted to private interests. In response to these rising predatory practices in IRG areas including southern territories, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Vice President Abdulrahman Al-Muhrrammi recently issued a directive to ban these illicit fees and levies. Only time will tell how this directive will be enforced and what impact it will ultimately have.

The Cost of Predatory Behavior: Conflict and Economic Collapse 

Predatory behavior in Yemen is directly responsible for increased conflict across the country. As factions like the Houthis continue to rely on violence to control resources and populations, this sparks resentment among the general population. That is because predatory actors exploit resources and pursue policies that serve the interests of a few, neglecting public welfare and leaving the population aggravated. In this backdrop of lost confidence and growing discontent with predatory actors controlling state institutions, people are forced to take matters into their own hands, resorting to violent resistance to defend their rights in the absence of justice and effective governing structures. In turn, the state-controlling elites further rely on brute force to suppress dissent, which escalates tensions and aggravates the existing grievances. Ultimately, widespread protests have frequently escalated into armed clashes or even small-scale rebellions such as the tribal conflict in Al-Bayda. The risk of further violent escalation remains high within each faction’s territories, as predatory behaviors continue to undermine the well-being of citizens.

Another major consequence of state predation is the economic collapse observed across the country. The proliferation of rent-seeking behaviors has destroyed the incentives for productive economic activity, as profits are extracted by predatory elites rather than being reinvested in growth and development. Rent-seeking is tightly connected to state predation, referring to the practice of individuals or groups to increase their own wealth without producing meaningful value or contributing to society's overall productivity. This behavior has compounded Yemen's economic crisis, as public funds are misappropriated for personal gain instead of being allocated to critical areas like infrastructure, healthcare, and education. As a result of this misuse of state resources and the lack of investment in productive sectors, public services and infrastructure have crumbled across much of the country, further exacerbating what is termed as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in Yemen.  

Changing the Game: Some Policy Recommendations 

Accountability is difficult to enforce during conflict due to the collapse of institutions and the use of violence by those in power to maintain control, leaving no space for oversight. However, as Yemen enters its controlled conflict phase, it is time to focus on changing the rule of the game and actively building institutional constraints to limit the ability of state actors to engage in predatory actions against their citizens. Research by Peter Boettke and Rosolino Candela demonstrates the importance of having constitutional frameworks that limit the state's political discretion, ensuring a stable environment conducive to long-term economic growth. Relatedly, according to well-cited paper by James Robinson, predatory behavior is more likely to occur in societies where the benefits of political power are large, natural resources are abundant, and human capital is low. These research findings provide us with good insights into what we need to start with to de-incentivize predatory behavior. Predatory political elites, for example, tend to resist developmental policies like public investment in education because such public benefits are long-term, and they even have the potential to destabilize their political control. Therefore, we need to develop new approaches for presenting developmental policy goals that appeal to the interests of political elites. This means demonstrating the direct benefits of creating inclusive institutions over extractive ones and showing how investing in productive sectors can support their power while maintaining societal welfare.

We must also pay close attention to the role of the international community in enabling predatory behavior. The substantial external support that successive Yemeni regimes received from regional and international allies allowed these regimes to consolidate power while neglecting public welfare. With substantial foreign backing, domestic political elites felt insulated from popular accountability, as their reliance on foreign aid diminished the need for domestic legitimacy. This dynamic became even more pronounced in conflict periods. In the current civil war, the Yemen IRG became so highly dependent on Saudi support that it can no longer resist its encroachments and meddling in local Yemeni affairs. To address this issue, while powerful states will continue to wield influence on weaker polities, we can at least advocate for international actors to condition their aid on specific institutional reforms focused on the long-term development of the country rather than short-term political calculations. Foreign aid is most effective when it is tied to measurable improvements in governance, education, and the development of human capital to ensure it contributes to building sustainable institutions that serve the Yemeni people as a whole rather than a select few.

A Concluding Remark 

It is worth noting that as long as the rules of the game remain the same, predatory behavior of political elites will continue to be a defining feature of Yemen’s governance and politics. While some actors are better predators than others as we have highlighted in this essay, the fact remains that efforts at changing governments and regimes will bring little positive change to the country. As long as this predatory behavior is rewarded, it will be reinforced and adopted by new generations of politicians and groups. Breaking this vicious cycle requires changing the institutional rules of the political system, limiting political discretion, and empowering a well-educated professional class capable of mobilizing the public to stand against the predatory practices of the elites. Over time, as this pressure builds, political elites will come to realize that their survival and interests are tied to the long-term stability and development of the country, making them more likely to abandon predatory behaviors and invest in Yemen’s prosperity.