The US intervention in Yemen is no longer just about maritime security, it’s a strategic gambit to reshape power dynamics, with Iran and the Houthis at the center of a widening conflict.

Dr. Marta Furlan (South24 Center)

Since the start of the Hamas-Israeli war in October 2023, the Houthis have obtained unprecedented international attention for their attacks against ships transiting through the Red Sea and for disrupting maritime traffic there. Far from being a localized regional matter, maritime security in the Red Sea is an issue of global concern, as Western, Arab, and Asian countries all depend on that route for commercial and energy trade. 

Understandably, this has posed a serious of challenges to regional countries such as Egypt – where President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi recently said that the monthly losses of the Suez Canal revenues due to the Houthis’ piracy have reached around $800 million– as well as countries beyond the region, where firms have been bearing the costs of having to divert their trade towards longer maritime routes. 

The US approach to Yemen under Biden’s administration

In response to the security threat posed by the Houthis, in December 2023 the US sent additional warships to the region, seeking to expand the Combined Task Force (CTF) 153. That first response was launched under the name Operation Prosperity Guardian.  As the Houthis proceeded to claim their first attack on a US warship on January 9, 2024, three days later Washington and London started Operation Poseidon Archer and launched a series of air strikes against Houthi-controlled areas of northern Yemen. Countries such as Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and New Zealand also contributed through non-operational support.

The strikes launched in the framework of Operation Poseidon Archer were directed against both static and mobile targets: the former hit Houthi military assets (e.g., facilities for producing or storing weapons, command-and-control centres, radar sites), while the latter hit pop-up mobile weapons systems that were considered an imminent threat to shipping. The objectives were to counter the threat posed by the Houthis to maritime trade and to deteriorate the military capabilities of the group.

However, those strikes substantially failed, as testified by the fact that throughout 2024 the Houthis continued their military operations – both their attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and their drone attacks against Israel.

The US approach to Yemen under Trump’s administration

Two days after taking office as President of the United States on January 20, 2025, Donald Trump proceeded to re-designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, thus reversing Biden’s decision from 2021 to de-list the group. 

Following that, in mid-March the US launched large-scale air strikes in Yemen with the stated goal of reinstating freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. According to regional media, Saada, Hajjah, Sanaa, Dhamar, Marib, Ibb, al-Bayda, and Taiz were all affected by the American strikes. During a media interview shortly after the airstrikes, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the US military “will continue to tactically engage Iranian-backed Houthis until they stop acting aggressively against U.S. ships in the region.”

These large-scale attacks launched on Yemen by the new US administration marked a strategic shift from previous ones authorised under former President Biden, in that they were directed at a broader range of targets and were specifically directed against Houthi leadership. In the words of the US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, the US “targeted multiple Houthi leaders and took them out.”

Overall, the redesignation of the Houthis and the new air strikes against the group’s leadership suggests a more confrontational policy on the part of the White House.

The Iranian factor

The attacks on the Houthis cannot be read and understood in isolation from the Trump administration’s approach to the Islamic Republic. Following the strikes, President Trump said that the Iranian leadership would be held responsible for “every shot fired by the Houthis” and warned Iran that it will face “dire” consequences if Yemen's Houthis continue to attack international shipping lanes. 

Thus, the American strikes against the Houthis and the subsequent warning to Iran seem aimed at reinforcing Trump’s goal of getting Tehran to engage in negotiations on its nuclear program. The military offensive, in fact, came a few days after President Trump sent a letter to Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to pressur Iran into negotiations on the nuclear issue. Reportedly, the letter (which was transferred to Teheran by a United Arab Emirates’ official) included a two-month deadline for reaching a new nuclear deal.

This adds to the “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions against Iran that President Trump re-instated on February 4, when he signed a National Security Presidential Memorandum “restoring maximum pressure on the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, denying Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon, and countering Iran’s malign influence abroad.”

However, the extent to which this approach will work is debatable. On the contrary, the past days have seen renewed push on part of prominent hardliners in Iran to abandon the country’s officially stated policy that it will never pursue nuclear weapons. Nournews, an outlet affiliated with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said there will be “no guarantees” that Iran will not abandon the Non-Proliferation Treaty if Trump and his administration maintain a threatening posture. Ahmad Naderi, a member of the presiding board of the Iranian parliament, also told a public session of the assembly that “perhaps it is time for us to rethink our nuclear, military and security doctrine”.

It is also debatable the extent to which the attacks and the threats will have any considerable effect on the Houthi-Iran relationship. While more on this will be said below, it is important to remember that the Houthis are part of the Iran-led Axis of Resistance, but they have traditionally been the most independent member of the Axis. They benefit from Iran’s support (weapons transfers, training, and intelligence support) and coordinate with Teheran to some extent, but take their strategic and operational decisions with autonomy. 

The US’ new approach to Yemen and the Houthis

As noted above, the airstrikes carried out by the US and the UK through Operation Poseidon Archer failed to deter the Houthis and degrade their capacities. While the attacks recently carried out by the US have been bigger in scope, it remains doubtful that they will succeed to convince the Houthis to change course. What is more certain is that it will be the Yemeni people to suffer the direct and indirect consequences of Trump’s new Yemen policy.

As they did over the past year, the Houthis will probably go underground and scatter their military infrastructure, taking advantage of the country’s topography. They will also instrumentalize the military attack by the US as an opportunity to capitalize on the anti-foreign intervention sentiments that prevail in Yemen and recruit new sympathizers, supporters, and fighters. They will also use the attacks as an opportunity to further consolidate their credibility within the regional landscape and Iran’s Axis of Resistance and acquire increasing visibility on the international and regional stage at the expense of the Yemeni legitimate government in the south.

In this regard, it is noticeable that after the attacks, the Houthis remained true to their usual bellicose and defiant rhetoric. The group’s Supreme Political Council, for instance, said they would not be deterred but would rather “escalate the situation to a more severe and dire level”. The statement also added that “targeting civilians demonstrates America’s inability to confront the situation”.

Conclusion

To avoid punishing the Yemeni people and to weaken the Houthis, a US comprehensive strategy towards Yemen seems to be the only way forward. 

Specifically, the Trump administration should invest its efforts to support a sustainable and credible peace process in Yemen. It should work towards strengthening (diplomatically, economically, and militarily) the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council, whose weakness and internal divisions make it badly positioned to negotiate on equal terms with the Houthis. At the same time, the US should work and coordinate on Yemen with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

For the moment being, however, officials in Washington seem disinterested in Yemen and its fate, and their approach to the country is exclusively limited to an aggressive anti-Houthi policy. As made clear by the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, American concerns about the Yemeni conflict only extend to countering threats to Washington’s interests in the region: “we don’t care what happens in the Yemeni civil war.”