Following the latest escalation between the Houthis and Israel, it has been remarkable that the pace of the Houthi operations in the Red Sea has so far witnessed relative subsidence and de-escalation. The path and prospects of escalation will largely be linked to some main determinants in the coming stage.

Mohammad Fawzi (South24)

Over the past days, especially since the Houthi militia targeted Tel Aviv on July 19, which Israel considered a crossing of a red line, and the subsequent Israeli strikes on the militia-controlled Port of Hodeida on July 20, there have been several changes at the level of confrontation between the Houthis and Israel. Thus, it has become very important to answer the question related to the limits of the changes in the bilateral deterrence equations and the confrontation rules between the two sides. This particularly coincides with some important regional changes, especially after Israel targeted a southern suburb in Beirut on July 30 that resulted in the killing of Hezbollah military commander Fuad Shukr, [1] and the assassination operation [2] that killed Chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. In this regard, it seems that the path of the Houthi-Israeli escalation will be largely linked to the changes of the current regional status, which would push forward the growing pace of confrontations between the two sides, whether directly or indirectly.

Changes in the Path of Escalation of Both Sides

The latest Houthi-Israeli escalation has witnessed many important changes that risk many negative repercussions.

The most prominent features of this transformation in the escalation include the following points:

1- Heading toward the Direct Confrontation Pattern: The dominant main feature and probably the qualitative turning point has been moving from the phase of indirect confrontations to the direct ones. In this regard, it can be said that the escalation between the two sides from October 2023 to July 19, 2024 was dominated by indirect targeting on the part of the Houthis. This included attacking ships in the Red Sea and some Israeli peripheral and coastal areas. For its part, Israel mainly relied on what can be described as “the deterrence policy adopted by the allies against the Houthis”. This particularly includes the new military alliances that were established in the Red Sea for this purpose, such as the ’Prosperity Guardian‘ [3] which was announced by the United States on December 19, 2023, and the European Union’s ’Operation Aspides‘ [4] launched on February 19, 2024. This is in addition to the American-British attacks against several Houthi sites in Yemen.

However, these tactics changed after July 18 when Israel’s military killed a field commander of the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia's elite Radwan forces in south Lebanon. In response, the Houthis targeted Tel Aviv on July 19 by launching a ballistic missile and four drones, one of which penetrated Israel’s radar systems undetected. The Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea said the strike was carried out using a new drone called ‘Yafa’, which he claimed was capable of bypassing interception systems and was undetectable by radars. The attack killed one person and injured seven. [5] In turn, Israel launched synchronized attacks on the Port of Hodeida on July 20 which focused on targeting infrastructure and fuel storage tanks in the Red Sea port, which was considered as the Houthis' economic lifeline and a key entry point for Iranian weapons into Yemen. [6] These developments have constituted a qualitative turning point in the path of the bilateral escalation, especially moving to the “direct confrontation” phase between the two sides. This means that henceforth each of them targets the strategic depth of the other.

2- The Israeli Confirmation about the Readiness to Open Several Fronts: Analyzing the media statements of both parties during the latest escalation, it is made quite apparent that the direct targeting operations will continue. The Houthis continue linking this escalation to the Israeli war on Gaza. On the other hand, Israel has warned that “its hands will reach any possible threatening sources coming from the Yemeni front”. This seems to be a clear message that Israel is capable of opening more than one front simultaneously.

In this regard, the Houthi Leader, Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, announced on July 21 that “targeting the Israeli depth (Tel Aviv) was the beginning of the 5th phase of escalation against Israel and that this new equation will continue during the coming periods and that the Israeli operations won’t deter the group. [7] On the other hand, the Israeli narrative has stressed that targeting of the Port of Hodeida, 1,600 km away from the Israel border, was in response to the Houthi operation in the heart of Tel Aviv. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, confirmed that “the Port of Hodeida was used for military purposes, it was used as an entry point for deadly weapons supplied to the Houthis by Iran.” He said that targeting the port “makes it clear to our enemies that there is no place that the long arm of the State of Israel will not reach.” [8]

3- Relative Subsidence in the Pace of the Houthi Escalation: Despite the latest escalation between the Houthis and Israel, curiously the pace of the Houthi operations in the Red Sea has witnessed noticeable relative subsidence and de-escalation. This is in spite of the escalatory media and political discourse following the targeting of the Port of Hodeida. It seems that this change is linked to some main considerations; the first of which is that the Houthis are basically busy dealing with the huge impact resulting from the Israeli military operation on the Port of Hodeida. The latter is strategically important as it receives 70% of Yemeni imports to the areas controlled by the group. Its importance has been enhanced after the Houthis targeted the Yemeni government-controlled ports of Hadramout and Shabwa in October 2022. The second reason is that there are some local changes and developments by which the Houthis probably seek to achieve big gains, foremost of which is the talk about an imminent deal to re-export Yemeni oil from government-held ports, of which the Houthis will take the lion’s share of revenues. The third consideration is the imbalance in the regional confrontation rules following the remarkable escalation between Hezbollah and Israel and the assassination of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. This currently has put the Houthis in a phase of rearranging their cards, based on these regional changes.

4- The Ongoing Western Escalation Against the Houthis: After a state of relative calmness by the Houthis following the Israeli targeting of the Port of Hodeida, the Iran-backed militia on August 4 launched a missile attack on a Liberian-flagged container ship traveling through the Gulf of Aden and also claimed downing a US MQ-9 drone in Sa'dah governorate. On August 7, the Houthis claimed they had attacked two warships of the United States and another commercial vessel in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain have continued their operations against the group’s locations, with the coalition on Wednesday (Aug 7) carrying out two airstrikes on Yemen's southwestern province of Taiz. The US Central Command announced on July 27 that its forces destroyed six drones affiliated with the Iran-backed Houthis within 24 hours in an  area controlled by the militia without identifying the location.[9] This is along with Washington’s hint by the US Special Envoy to Yemen, Tim Lenderking, that it is examining designating the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization like the Al-Qaeda. [10] The ongoing escalation approach, especially by Washington, apparently comes in light of some considerations. The first is that this state may be an indication about Washington’s belief that the Houthis don’t subject themselves to its conditions. The second one is that this may be an indication about international divisions regarding the typical pattern in which to deal with the Houthis. The third is Washington's view about the need to continue the escalation against the Yemeni group in a way that guarantees restoring the lost deterrence.

Multiple Connotations

Despite this big transformation in the path of the Houthi-Israeli escalation, it is apparently aimed at achieving some political goals, away from the limitation of the military ones. This can be illustrated as below:

1- Political Messaging by the Houthis rather than Military: The Houthis have aimed to achieve some goals that are of political nature. The first is delivering messages about the growing military capabilities of the militia. The second is the continuation of its solidarity with and support to the Palestinian factions and those affiliated with Iran in the region. This is in addition to enhancing the Houthi’s relative weight within the frame of Iran’s regional equation. This is along with achieving internal gains in light of uniting of the Palestinian cause in the Arab popular heart. The third one is confirming the group’s capability to target the Israeli depth which would embarrass the Netanyahu government and put it under great pressure internally in Israel.

2- The Israeli Quest to Restore the Lost Strategic Deterrence: Despite the “quality” of the Israeli targeting of the Port of Hodeida which is considered the first direct Israeli confrontation with the Houthis, this operation has been able to achieve some certain political goals. The first is saving face internally in Israel after the feelings of resentment toward the failure of the Israeli air defenses to intercept the Houthi drone that hit Tel Aviv on July 19. The second is the quest for restoring the lost strategic deterrence against the Houthis and the Iran-affiliated factions in the region. This deterrence has largely declined to the extent that it pushed the Houthis to target the Israeli depth. The third one is that the Israeli attack focused on targets of logistic and economic nature. On one hand, this has ensured inflicting the Houthis with massive economic losses which in turn increases the popular pressure on the group. On the other hand, this guarantees not expanding the attrition war with the Houthis. This means that the operation was like a showy one.

3- Synchronization with Regional Escalation: It seems that there is a remarkable link between the increase in the Houthi escalation pace represented in moving toward the pattern of direct confrontations and the current regional status as well as the ramifications and the outcomes of the Israeli war on Gaza, especially amid flaring confrontations between some factions in the region and Israel. This is particularly related to Lebanese Hezbollah as many predict that it will turn into an open war between the two sides. One shouldn’t ignore that the current regional status is in a state of great fluidity amid links between different escalation fronts. Thus, the transformation in the path of the Houthi-Israeli escalation can’t be separated from the escalation being witnessed in the region in general.

Finally, it can be said that the path and prospects of the Houthi-Israeli escalation will be largely linked to some main determinants in the coming phase. The first one is to what extent the ongoing talks about a ceasefire in Gaza will be able to solve the disputed issues and bring an end to the war. The second is related to the escalation paths on other fronts, especially the Hezbollah front. The third determinant is the Iranian approach to deal with these regional developments. In light of these prominent determinants and indications, it can be said that the most likely scenario regarding the Houthi-Israeli front will see a continuous growing pace in the bilateral escalation, including direct and attrition confrontations. Meanwhile, every party will be keen to avoid reaching the point of an open war and intensified operations.