In the lead-up to the election, Yemeni-Americans across the spectrum reached out to Trump. Aside from lobbying for Gaza, they voiced concerns on Yemen's war. Disappointed with Biden, they sought a tough stance on the Houthis and a peace plan.

Fernando Carvajal (South24 Center)

Prior to the US presidential election on November 5th, Yemen swayed between the possibility of continued status quo under Kamala Harris and the chaotic unpredictability under Donald Trump. Since the outcome was announced naming Trump as president-elect, Houthis have pledged their resolve to continue attacks along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, while rival Yemeni parties jockey for attention as the Coalition prepares to manage a hawkish US approach to Iran. Trump has already disappointed voters with his staunch pro-Israel Cabinet, fueling Houthi propaganda, but it’s his list of nominees for State, Defense and UN ambassador that grants observers better insight on his approach to the conflict in Yemen. The degree of unpredictability, driven by Trump’s profit-driven, hands-on approach to policy-making, remains the primary concern for analysts and regional leaders. 

The Yemen file has an unique place in US foreign policy since the time of the Obama administration, and interestingly enough as a consequence of prioritizing the nuclear deal with Iran. The US has given Saudi Arabia the lead in Yemen throughout the ongoing civil war, but unlike Obama, Trump didn’t focus on institutions to manage relations with Saudi Arabia. In his first term (2017-21), Trump used individuals like his son-in-law Jared Kushner to engage wealthy Gulf monarchies. We already see this approach used as he prepares to begin his second term. This past weekend, Head of Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) Yasir Al-Rumayyan sat next to Trump during a UFC fight. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed visited Trump at his Mar-a-Lago luxury resort in September.  

Observers should remember that Trump didn’t designate the Houthis as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2021 because US agencies proposed it. He did so in response to pressure from regional partners, who may no longer see this approach as productive today, otherwise they would have used all their leverage on President Biden to re-designate the Houthis as FTO. Observers should keep in mind that current Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed Bin Mubarak served as ambassador to Washington during the first Trump administration, and was fairly close to Kushner and other Trump advisors.  

Under Trump, Yemen will remain between the predictable and unpredictable. "The Trump administration policy of course is hard to nail down right now given…the transition process,” said Dr. Theodore Karasik a Non-resident Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation. Mohammed al-Qadhi, senior political advisor at the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, agrees that “Trump is…difficult to predict.. but…we might see tough[er] action by his administration.”  Yet, Trump’s first term provides ample evidence of where his foreign policy principles lie and what are his goals. His priority is personal profit, so we can expect more deals with GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states that advance billions in business opportunities. This may actually act as a force of moderation, as GCC states cannot afford escalation or expansion of the armed conflict between Iran and Israel, for example. Saudi Arabia cannot move forward with normalization under the current situation in Gaza and Lebanon. Trump’s ”maximum pressure” approach to Iran may be tamed by Gulf states looking to cool tensions with Tehran, while expecting Trump to somehow contain (Israeli PM Benjamin) Netanyahu and force an immediate ceasefire across occupied territories. 

Liberated Yemen, between a Rock and a Hard Place

The wider Middle East region is much different today than when Trump was first in office. Yemen, in particular, is a totally different game than when Trump dared launch military operations in 2017. Houthi capabilities are far more advanced and have demonstrated the permanence of their threat beyond Yemeni territory; while the Legitimate Government, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), is deeply fractured and engulfed by a deepening economic crisis across liberated areas in south Yemen. 

Since President Biden revoked the FTO listing of Houthis in January 2021, Saudi Arabia has taken on the full package in Yemen. The Kingdom lobbied Trump to designate the Houthis as terrorists in order to gain leverage in negotiations with the Sanaa-based group, only for Biden to pull the rug from under the Kingdom as UN officials and international Non-governmental Organizations (iNGOs) warned of a deepening humanitarian crisis across Houthi-held territories. Biden later appointed Tim Lenderking as US Special Envoy to Yemen, adding an unexpected diplomatic layer to the conflict. 

In the lead up to the presidential election, Yemeni-Americans from across the political spectrum reached out to Trump. Aside from lobbying for an end to the conflict in Gaza, Yemeni-Americans raised their concerns with Trump over the war in Yemen. Expressing disappointment with the Biden administration, Yemenis pushed for a hard line against the Houthis and a peace plan. One person familiar with the discussions mentioned that Yemenis also asked Trump to shut down the office of the US Special envoy created by President Biden. Such demands illustrate the level of frustration among Yemenis over the past four years.

President Biden came under mounting pressure during his term from activists and Yemeni-Americans for failing to contribute to a military or diplomatic resolution of the war in Yemen. The US president had dug himself in a deep hole when he promised a hard line on Saudi Arabia on human rights, leading to tension with the Kingdom even on the Yemen file. In hindsight, Tim Lenderking has had minimal impact on the diplomatic track led by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg, especially during the process to push out President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi to establish the PLC in April 2022. 

Houthi rival parties across the spectrum have tried to pressure the US, and European powers, to engage the Houthis beyond diplomatic efforts. Attempts by Houthi rivals to gain military assistance from Western powers have been hindered by a dependance on the Coalition, which constrains the degree of cooperation between factions and governments outside the GCC. Since signing the Riyadh agreement (in 2019), the flow of weapons and access to foreign military aid remains within Saudi Arabia’s sphere, primarily to contain the balance of power on the ground between the anti-Houthi factions. There is no doubt Saudi Arabia prioritizes reaching a lasting deal with the Houthis, but for Yemeni parties this comes at a high cost where their interests are secondary in order to ensure a balance that deters Houthis from launching drone or missile strikes across Saudi territory. 

The current situation places Yemeni parties between a rock and a hard place. Dependance on Saudi Arabia in fact constrains Houthi rivals, to the advantage of the latter, while reaching out to unpredictable Trump and his officials may come at a very high price. 

A Threat, more than a Solution 

As Arab-American voters found out days after the election, Trump represents a bigger unpredictable threat than a positive force for peace. Yemeni-Americans are now wary Trump will also back down on Yemen and resume his hands-off approach since the Yakla raid in 2017 (in Al-Bayda in which around 30 civilians were killed including the eight-year-old American daughter of slain Al-Qaeda preacher Anwar al-Awlaki). While Dr. Thomas Juneau, professor at University of Ottawa, said the “Trump administration could also deepen security and defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE” as an expansion of Operation Prosperity Guardian, it is highly unlikely Trump will commit further military assets to counter the Houthis. 

A major area of concern as the Trump administration takes shape is their views on the role of the United Nations (UN). Trump has nominated Republican Elise Stefanik as UN ambassador and Steven C. Witkoff as US Special Envoy to the Middle East, potential threats to current structures in the region. In the case of Yemen, closing the office of the US Special Envoy would centralize diplomatic efforts with regional partners, while marginalizing the UN Special Envoy in the process. This structure would place Saudi Arabia directly on the driver seat, shouldering all responsibility for the peace process. “Saudi Arabia needs the UN to drive the peace process, it grants the Kingdom legitimacy and a structure to oversee the process,” said Yemen analyst Nasser al-Muwada.

Dr. Karasik noted this time around “there are many players in the Yemen arena [and] the situation is increasingly worse.” For those expecting a tougher approach in Yemen by Trump, Karasik warns “pressure is likely to escalate further because the Red Sea threat to safety needs to stop as part of the transition process between administrations.” After a year since the start of hostilities along the Red Sea by Houthis, the rebels have demonstrated operational capabilities that assure the permanence of threats across the Bab al-Mandab.  

Dr. Juneau recognizes that Yemen’s neighbors “fear…triggering Houthi retaliation with missile or drone strikes”, but believes the monarchies may remain “reluctant to be publicly and visibly engaged in US initiatives to counter the Houthis.” This leaves PLC factions unable to match Houthi military capabilities, keeping millions of Yemenis hostage to Houthi threats across military fronts and a downward spiraling economy.   

Conclusion 

Biden’s approach to Yemen relied on three main instruments: US Special Envoy, sanctions regime and Operation Prosperity Guardian. In January, the US listed Houthis as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), to support a series of sanctions against individuals or companies engaged in smuggling, weapons procurement and shipping. Months later, the Houthis remain undeterred.  

Houthis claimed their attacks on civilian vessels across Bab al-Mandab were launched in support of Palestinians in Gaza. If Trump targets Iran under his “maximum pressure” policy it could lead to a new round of escalation by Houthis. Trump may take a “tough action … including designation of Houthis as FTO,” says al-Qadhi, but at this stage FTO listing would be an empty threat, and Saudi Arabia would likely oppose the renewed listing. Trump would face less opposition from the UN as their efforts to rally international donors have fallen short over the past three years in a row. During this year’s donor conference for Yemen commitments fell short by $2 billion. 

UN agencies and iNGOs would also hesitate in obstructing US efforts to pressure the Houthis since the June round up of humanitarian staff in Sanaa. Dozens remain detained with no prospects for a deal to release them. Trump could have room to operate here, constrained by the Coalition in order to prevent any obstruction of efforts to engage the Houthis in a peace process.