The PLC: Delayed Decisions and Idle Solutions

Over the past 100 days, since the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) took over, it was expected to begin a new and qualitative path to complete the restoration of the state and to overcome the economic challenges as well as improving the government’s performance. This is especially related to the move by most political and administrative officials from Riyadh to the capital city of Aden to begin doing their tasks and activating the state institutions from there including members of the House of Representatives. However, days following taking the oath by the PLC members proved that this stage is not much different from the previous one. Quickly, some political figures including members in the House of Representatives and the Shura Council left the country to stay abroad.

Additionally, other PLC members left Aden one month after the declaration of it this includes Tariq Saleh, Othman Majali, Sultan Al-Arada and Faraj Al-Bahsani. The last two figures also serve as governors of Hadramout and Marib, respectively, amid expectations that the PLC could appoint new governors. The absence of the PLC from Aden is another proof of the sharp political paralysis and the continuous failure. It is obviously something that obstructs any progress in treating the status quo.

It is important to say that the war, raging in Yemen since 2014, enhanced a culture of submissiveness within the Yemeni politicians by accepting the minimum solutions proposed by their allies although they were able to pose pressure and find more realistic ones to end the catastrophic situation experienced by the state over 8 years. It was possible to benefit from the truce which is about to complete its fourth month. This can be achieved through full arrangement of the military and security situation. Additionally, preparations have to be taken for military resolution by making decisive military changes to manage the war or by arranging the situation of the legitimate authority. This includes selecting the team which participates in the peace operation. However, those two steps have not been done yet. Nevertheless, the PLC established a joint security and military committee according to article 5 of the power transfer declaration [1]. 

The committee consists of 59 members, led by Major General Haitham Qassem Taher. However, the features of the committee's work are still unclear. Will it issue decisions or recommendations for the PLC? Will the latter reach consensus to take military decisions based upon the committee's recommendations? This stirs important questions about who will lead the military operation if the allies resolve to the military solution. Will it be a joint operation room run by the PLC? Or being an operation room affiliated with the Arab Coalition? This could make a difference regarding the coordination and the organization. 

There is no doubt that the previous Hadi authority left a heavy legacy for the PLC including a set of fundamental crises, especially the humanitarian and the economic ones. This creates urgent questions to the PLC of "will it begin the solutions and how will it save the country amid numerous affiliations and the different opinions among its members?". The controversy increases among the anti-Houthi political parties when reports about possible appointments are leaked. For example, the unilateral decisions taken by the PLC Chairman Rashad Al-Alimi raised wide controversy by appointing Adnan Al-Salawi as the head of the press department, and Mohammed Al-Moqbili as the head of the youth department. The first figure has ties with the Houthis and lives in Sanaa while the second one is close to the Muslim Brotherhood and stays in Turkey. This added to the volume of controversy, especially by Southern activists who believe that these appointments could undermine the work of the new PLC. These figures are always seen by the Southerners as rivals.