Saying that the AQAP has completely declined is an exaggeration. Despite the challenges, the organization still poses a dangerous security threat in Yemen and the region, and has proven its ability for adaptation and evolution.

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Ibrahim Ali* (South24)

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Although data points to a decline in the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) influence in Yemen over the last few years, this is largely linked to the abnormal circumstances imposed by the ongoing conflict that began in 2015. This stirs questions about the sustainability of this decline and whether it necessarily reflects an erosion of the organization's abilities. Despite the apparent slump in its activities, the AQAP may retain its terrorizing abilities internally and externally.

The dominant approach for evaluating the decline of the AQAP is based on comparing the present situation to what existed before 2014. However, this comparison may be inaccurate as each period is characterized by its peculiarities. The apparent decline may be in fact a cover for tactical transformation, or rearrangement of priorities, or putting a freeze on the activities for special reasons. It doesn't necessarily reflect a major weakness in the organization's structure, as suggested in the latest report issued by UN experts.

Although the experts stressed on the AQAP's decreasing activities in Yemen, a recent report by the US Congress pointed to serious concerns about a possible escalation of its threats in the near future. These concerns are based on the long history of dealing with the Al-Qaeda, especially its branch in Yemen. Through its accumulated experience, Washington is well aware of the organization's ability to adapt and evolve. This makes the US cautious about predicting a complete decline of its influence, despite a decrease in its activities at the operational level. Moreover, the US realizes the AQAP’s ability to recover and re-establish its activities. This makes any temporary decline in its strength a relative matter. Accordingly, this requires more caution and not to rely on reports that profess to confirm the decline of the organization. 

Before the Decline

The AQAP has witnessed a considerable decline in its activities over the past years following a period of expansion and major influence. It can be said that the organization reached the climax of its operational activities in 2013-2014, especially in the aftermath of the signing of a UN-brokered political agreement in September 2014 among the warring Yemeni parties, with regional and international sponsorship.

Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s declaration of launching a military operation against the Houthi “coup” in Yemen in 2015, when it was an opportunity for the AQAP to expand its influence, the latter largely failed in doing so, despite having established early control over the city of Al-Mukalla and large areas of Shabwa and Abyan during 2015 and 2016. This failure has been basically attributed to the major intervention by the UAE in supporting and establishing Southern specialized military counterterrorism units. These were later expanded to include military and security establishments affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC). As a result, the AQAP’s operations have largely declined.

The factors that have led to weakening of the terror group include its participation in the anti-Houthi war, indirectly at first within the fronts of the Islamic Islah Party and the Hadi Government in the governorates of Marib and Al-Bayda as well as other cities. This participation helped infiltrate into the organization at the security level and facilitated monitoring, chasing, and targeting of its leaders. Later, the organization participated in the Islah Party’s fighting fronts against the Southern forces in the governorates of Abyan and Shabwa.

Furthermore, the AQAP took a pivotal decision by rejecting ISIS' Caliphate Declaration, which led to internal disagreements and triggered defections that led to many members getting killed or injured. The battles between the AQAP and the Islamic State of Yemen (ISY) occurred in the Wald Rabi district in central Yemen between 2017-2020. The AQAP’s losses increased after it was driven out of its strongholds following confrontations with the Houthi militias in 2021. This pushed it to create new bastions in areas controlled by the Internationally-Recognized Government and the Islah Party in Shabwa, Abyan, and Marib.

Sudden Comeback

Despite these blows, the AQAP has mostly resumed its terrorist operations in Abyan and Shabwa in South Yemen in spite of the ongoing military and security campaigns against it. In August 2022, the Southern forces, affiliated with the STC, launched security and military operations in the two governorates targeting the AQAP’s fortified strongholds that hadn’t been approached during the former Yemeni regime. Operations ’Arrows of the East’ (by the STC) and ‘Arrows of the South’ (by STC-affiliated organizations to combat terrorist groups in Shabwa) came amid the AQAP’s difficult security situation, especially after the STC’s forces gained control over Abyan and Shabwa governorates at the security and political levels in 2022. These areas were under the control of forces affiliated with the Internationally-Recognized Government that was accused of collusion with the AQAP which was able to establish alternative strongholds after being driven out of Al-Bayda in 2021. As a result of special understandings or calculations, the forces affiliated with the Islah party didn’t oppose the organization’s presence within their controlled areas. In return, the AQAP didn’t consider these forces as a target, and even fitted along with them against the STC’s units in the two governorates in 2019-2020.

However, the Yemeni legitimate government’s failure in establishing its control in Abyan and Shabwa has created a big crisis, with the AQAP building its strongholds there, coupled with the choking financial mess. This has pushed the AQAP to call the tribes to support it although it never made such a public request to the tribes or others during its tough circumstances. However, the current conditions are apparently harsher. As a result, many sections expected that the organization is approaching its demise in Yemen. Nonetheless, its latest attacks against the Southern forces – the August 16 suicide attack in which 16 Southern force soldiers were killed and 18 injured in Mudiyah district of Abyan -- indicate its contention to take the initiative for the first time since 2021. The escalation of operations isn’t the only surprise element of the AQAP’s comeback, but also the tools the group has been using to carry out attacks. For the first time, the organization is using drones to monitor, chase, and bomb targets. Since May 2023, AQAP has increasingly been using drones in its attacks against Southern military forces in Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Although reports indicate that this comeback may be as a result of the Houthi’s military and logistic support, there are other factors that have helped in the comeback, including the demise of the ISIS and Saif Al-Adel’s taking over as Leader of the Al-Qaeda after Al-Zawahiri’s killing in a US drone strike in Kabul in July 2022.

Oman’s Expulsion of ex-Guantanamo Detainees

Although the relationship between Oman and the AQAP wasn’t bad as Muscat communicated with the organization on some occasions, including by way of meditation for release of hostages in return for ransom, the sultanate took a surprise decision in the past weeks to expel about 28 Yemenis who were ex-Guantanamo detainees and strip them of privileges and legal residence, according to Western reports. The Sultanate of Oman had earlier agreed to resettle the Yemeni men from Guantanamo Bay between 2015 and 2017.

The Washington Post previously reported that for several years, Oman had hosted the detainees of the Guantanamo US military prison, providing them with housing, healthcare and jobs, and even helped them find wives and start families to reduce their suffering during the detainment years. The 28 Yemenis who were transferred to Oman by the Obama administration between 2015-2017 were part of an Omani program to rehabilitate them. However, Oman’s latest move stirs many questions, especially as the Al-Qaeda hasn’t carried out any operations in the Gulf state or threatened to do so. Moreover, the July 15 attack on the Ali bin Abi Talib mosque in the Wadi Kabir area near Muscat that targeted Shiite celebrants of Ashura, killing six people, was claimed by the ISIS.

Oman’s aim behind returning the ex-Guantanamo detainees to Yemen may be a surreptitious way of supporting the AQAP that suffers from a lack of human cadres. This Omani move is unlikely to be linked to the shooting at the Al-Wadi Al-Kabir area of Muscat as the detainees are former jihadis who can be affiliated with Al-Qaeda, not ISIS. Furthermore, they haven’t made any dubious moves, according to a specialist in armed groups affairs who spoke to ’South24 Center’.

Returning the ex-detainees to Sanaa means facilitating their joining the AQAP in Yemen, where the Houthis, who control the capital, have good relations with the organization. Under the tag of “prisoner exchange”, the Houthis have released hundreds of AQAP elements detained in the prisons of the former regime. Iran’s role in the Omani decision to expel the ex-Guantanamo detainees can’t be excluded.

The aforementioned source, who demanded anonymity, believes that Oman’s move has nothing to do with preventing the carrying out of terror operations in the sultanate in future. He ruled out that the AQAP coordinated with Oman for the return of the detainees to Yemen, although there is a contact line between the two parties, as shown in the mediation for release of Western hostages.

What confirms that the Omani action was not chalked out in advance is that the administration of US President Joe Biden was planning in the fall of 2023 to send 11 more Yemenis from Guantanamo to Oman, according to a report by the Washington Post. However, US officials said that the administration has temporarily halted the move, at the request of Congress members, after the outbreak of the Gaza war.

The return of the ex-detainees to Yemen and facilitating their joining the AQAP will compensate the organization for the losses it has incurred over the past years at the leadership level. These ex-detainees are old jihadis who gained big experience during their presence in Afghanistan. Previous occurrences indicate that several released Guantanamo detainees returned to the organization, such as Osama bin Laden’s driver, Ibrahim Al-Qousi. In a country like Yemen, amid a fragile security situation, plagued by poor livelihood conditions, and non-stop conflict, the ex-detainees deported by Oman will find the AQAP their only sanctuary.

Based on these concerns, the US Congress objected to deporting the Guantanamo detainees to countries torn by war such as Yemen as they can constitute security threats. However, “Forever Wars” quoted Omani officials as claiming that the US had given the green light for expelling the 28 Yemenis.

The Suicide Operation in Mudiyah

Amid the controversy around the decline of the AQAP in Yemen, the organization carried out a suicide attack in Abyan on August 16. The suicide attacker was a person from Abyan who detonated the car bomb that killed 16 soldiers and injured 18 others. This indicates that the AQAP still enjoys significant organizational and logistic capabilities and is able to recruit people for suicide missions as well as launching wide-range attacks in security-sensitive areas.

It should be noted that the AQAP used a suicide attack this time following a period when it ceased carrying out this kind of operation. This indicates that the AQAP no longer suffers from a lack in human resources. This may also point to local or regional support from outside the organization, whether a financial or a logistic or an intelligence aid. This was suggested by senior officials in the Southern forces and the STC.

The boldness of the operation indicates that the organization’s activities may escalate during the coming period. This is since the AQAP used to avoid carrying out such big operations when it is in a weak state as they prompt large security and military moves against it.

Despite a decline in the AQAP’s operational activities in Yemen over the past years, this doesn’t necessarily mean a decrease in its strength and ability to carry out internal or cross-border attacks like it did in the past. The escalation of its operations in the Southern governorates and dealing with new weapons such as drones point out that its comeback is developing. It is important to state that the organization’s central leadership, Al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel, currently lives in Iran along with several other senior members of the group, and they are known to pay special attention to the Yemeni branch. This means that Al-Qaeda leaders are betting on AQAP regarding its future projects.

It isn’t unlikely that the AQAP received financial and logistic support from Iran as it operates in areas that aren’t under the Houthi control. Reports have confirmed that the drones used by the AQAP were facilitated by the Houthis through training and logistic support, and significantly, the two parties have ceased to target each other since 2022.

Finally, saying that the AQAP has completely declined is an exaggeration. Despite the challenges, the organization still constitutes a dangerous security threat in Yemen and the region, and has proven its ability for adaptation and evolution. This makes destroying it completely a difficult task, at least currently. To eradicate the organization completely, the war in Yemen should end. It is a main condition to stop the escalation of violence and terrorism, and for rebuilding the country and effective institutions. This is in addition to combating corruption and nepotism in state institutions. It is important to enhance international and regional cooperation to counter terrorism as well as providing sufficient support to the Southern forces that have been engaged for years in battling the organization, and continue to do so.