South24 Center republishes the key introductions and select infographics from its comprehensive 2024 annual report, released in Arabic on December 29 under the title: "From Land to Sea: Yemen Under the Fire of Tangled Crises."

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Introduction

By Ayad Qassem

The conflict in Yemen completed its 10th year in 2024, taking a regional and international turn that portends more humanitarian and economic consequences against millions of people who are already under the threat of poverty and starvation. 

The Houthi escalation of launching missile attacks on commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and against Israel under the pretext of “supporting Gaza” has been a turning point in the conflict, dragging Yemen into more chaos and uncertainty. This escalation led to a major military intervention by the United States and Britain, and pushed Israel to target Yemeni civilian facilities for the first time. These developments have obstructed any prospects of a peace process in Yemen through the UN-sponsored roadmap announced in late 2023.

Though the US in January 2024 announced the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization with an aim to dry up their sources of funding, the Iran-backed militia quickly adapted to that by imposing levies on maritime transportation. Their economic control has continued through imposing taxes and levies on traders. Moreover, they persist with their military threats against allowing oil exports from ports in South Yemen, which is under the Internationally Recognized Government. In terms of negotiations, the efforts of the UN Envoy to Yemen Hans Grundberg have been thwarted despite his diplomatic tours. This has weakened the prospects of peace, bringing back to the forefront the indications of a renewal of war. The Yemeni government witnessed a limited reshuffle amid a severe economic crisis, that hit millions of people in South Yemen and the Northern areas controlled by the government. Amidst all this, Southern concerns about the attempts to undermine the South Issue have escalated. This emerged after the establishment of the US-sponsored ’National Bloc of Yemeni Political Parties’ in November, evoking feelings of dismay at the lack of seriousness by the Northern parties in confronting the Houthis and achieving tangible development in Southern areas. This is in addition to the absence of a clear path regarding sharing power and decision-making within the institutions of the so-called “legitimacy”, such as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), that adopt a firm stance in favor of restoring the state of South Yemen. 

Militarily, the number of Houthi attacks increased to 166, targeting ships as well as regional and international forces. This is in addition to 38 attacks against Israel, according to statistics collated by ’South24 Center‘. 

Locally, the Houthis launched 33 attacks against the Southern forces, killing 47 soldiers. The Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) carried out 21 attacks, especially in Abyan and Shabwa, that killed 48 soldiers affiliated with the STC’s Southern forces. Notably, 2024 witnessed growing coordination between the AQAP and the Houthis against the STC. The Southern forces responded by implementing counter operations and securing strategic locations despite the lack of clear international support for the counterterrorism operations. All of this has escalated the security threats locally and regionally. The AQAP used sophisticated technology in their operations such as drones, while the Houthis used bomb boats and hypersonic missiles.

The Yemeni economy witnessed a severe deterioration as the price of the US dollar exceeded 2,050 Yemeni riyals for the first time. Additionally, the continuous cessation of oil exports in Southern areas due to the Houthi threats led to incurring of $6 billion-losses by the Internationally-Recognized Government (IRG). During the year, the poverty rate increased to 74% as half of the population suffers from severe food shortage. Reversing of the economic measures against the Houthi regime, under Saudi pressure, has led to losing trust in the institutions affiliated with the Internationally-Recognized Government. This has encouraged the Houthis to continue their bizarre financial policies. In response to this deterioration, a new batch of the Saudi financial grant, along with an additional one, amounting to $500 million, has boosted the hopes of the Yemeni government to survive the severe economic crisis in South Yemen. The people had to grapple with livelihood crisis in addition to the growing power outages and rising prices. Despite some initiatives such as a solar energy plant in Aden, the development efforts have remained limited. International reports have pointed to a possible further 1% GDP shrinkage if the conflict continues. 

The humanitarian crises escalated in 2024 with over 18 million people needing help. Around 250,000 cases of cholera, 33 of polio, and 1.05 million of malaria were detected in Yemen. Child malnutrition rates rose to their worst levels in 40 years, with four districts in Taiz and Hodeidah entering the starvation phase. In addition, the floods killed 122 people and displaced thousands of families. The World Bank also pointed to the increasing impact of climate change on food security. The spread of mines and explosives killed and injured hundreds, especially in Hodeidah.

In terms of freedoms in 2024, Yemen's ranking improved to 154th in the World Press Freedom Index. However, the Houthis violated human rights after arresting dozens of employees affiliated with UN and international bodies, accusing them of spying for international intelligence agencies. 

In the annual report, a team affiliated with ’South24 Center‘ monitored more than 700 events and attributed them to their sources. By using graphics and charts, the report highlights the most prominent and important events. This is in addition to shedding light on various activities carried out by ’South24 Center‘ during the year. 

This report serves as an important and strategic reference and a guideline for journalists, researchers, activists, and stakeholders.

The Political Axis

By Farida Ahmed

Yemen witnessed accelerated developments during 2024 after the Houthis escalated their maritime military confrontations against the ’Operation Prosperity Guardian‘ coalition, led by the US and Britain, formed in response to the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. This escalation included targeting commercial and military ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Bab Al-Mandab, and the Red Sea. This pushed some countries, led by the United States, to carry out military airstrikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. Such an escalation complicates the Yemeni crisis, fading the hopes of reaching a ceasefire peace deal. Despite previous efforts, including the roadmap declaration by Grundberg in late 2023, the heightened developments of 2024 brought the crisis back to square one. This has pushed international and regional parties to revise their strategies and re-evaluate their choices in dealing with the troubled situation.

On February 15, the US’ decision to classify the Houthis as a ’Specially Designated Global Terrorist‘ group came into effect with an aim to dry up their economic funding sources and limit their military capabilities. However, the Houthis adapted to these pressures through creating alternative funding channels, including imposing illegal levies and fees on some maritime shipping agencies in return for allowing them to sail safely through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, according to a report prepared by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen. In addition, the Iran-backed militia established joint military supply networks with the Somali movement ‘Al-Shabaab’, which is affiliated with the Al-Qaeda.

Within Yemen, the Houthis tightened their grip on the economy in the areas under their control. They exploited trade and public assets as a main funding source to finance their military operations. They also imposed heavy illegal taxes and levies on people. This has exacerbated the public ire, deepening the economic and humanitarian crisis in the country.

Amid the escalation of tragic conditions in Gaza due to the expansion of the war scope and the killing of thousands of civilians in Israeli attacks, the international silence toward the Israeli Army’s violations in the strip gave the Houthis the pretext to present themselves as heroes to Arab people and as the defenders of Gaza. Thus, they gained popular support, allowing them to intensify their attacks on ships. The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) repeatedly called on the international community to support the local forces to confront the Houthi attacks against the maritime vessels. However, it is clear that evaluating the military options of the Internationally-Recognized Government by Washington and its allies would need more time in light of the multiplicity of local power balances on the ground and their political differences.

The Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government also witnessed a limited reshuffle in early 2024, which saw the appointment of Ahmed Awad Bin Mubarak as the Prime Minister and Shaya Al-Zindani as the Foreign Minister. These changes came amid the tough economic conditions and growing security challenges, which have given rise to questions about the government’s efficiency in managing the crisis. The Internationally-Recognized Government has so far failed to achieve tangible progress in addressing the deteriorating economic conditions. This can be attributed to several factors, including the growing Saudi regional pressure on the Yemeni government in July to reverse the economic measures it had announced against the Houthis. 

As part of his tireless efforts to revive the comprehensive negotiation process in Yemen, Grundberg conducted tours to some countries during the year. These tours focused on the holding of in-depth consultations with the Yemeni parties, including the STC, and peace-supporting countries, with an aim to reach an all-out political solution that would end the ongoing conflict. However, the repeated military escalation in the Red Sea, especially recently, has cast a shadow on these efforts in a way that increases the complexity of the political scene, undermining the peace prospects. This was clear through Grundberg’s unprecedented pessimistic speech when he said that Yemenis will not wait forever for the peace roadmap, warning of the country sliding back into war.

During the last months of the year, the United States remarkably sponsored a new Yemeni political entity under the name of the ’National Bloc of Yemeni Political Parties and Components‘ in Aden. It consists of 22 parties and political groups, led by the Islah Party (Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood). Many Southerners have opposed the establishment of the bloc, expressing their concerns about shifting the path of the Yemeni efforts toward South Yemen rather than the Houthis in the North. However, the US has become apparently more responsive to the terms “confrontation with Houthis” or “the coup” included in the closing statement issued by the bloc. Securing the Red Sea is currently more urgent for Washington and the Western states than before. Thus, they may carry out any option to end or reduce the Houthi threat.

November and December 2024 witnessed intensified meetings between the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) members and the ambassadors of the US, Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in Riyadh in order to arrive at a deal and a mechanism to carry out practical proposed steps to correct the path of the Internationally-Recognized Government, achieve economic and livelihood development in the PLC-controlled areas, and reformulate the partnership concept between the South and the North. However, these efforts have failed due to the deliberate indecisiveness of the Yemeni parties and their lack of a serious approach to achieve progress, including confronting the Houthis. As a result, the PLC Member and STC President Aidrous Al-Zubaidi withdrew from the last meeting in Riyadh on December 24.

These developments come at a time when mutual Israeli-Houthi attacks are escalating and amid Tel Aviv's efforts to mobilize an international stance against the Iranian-backed group.

It can be said that the political and military future of Yemen is currently characterized by extreme ambiguity. In light of the ongoing internal and external armed conflicts, the multiplicity of regional and international actors in the region, and the rapid changes in balance in the Middle East after the collapse of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria, the prospects of reaching a stable peaceful solution remain uncertain. The Yemeni crisis is likely to either witness a new military escalation on a wider scale in the Red Sea, driven by the escalation of regional and international tensions, or the existing circumstances will push the Yemeni parties to the negotiating table in order to find a political solution that ends the suffering of Yemeni people.

Military and Security Axis

By Jacob Alsufyani

2024 witnessed continued military and security tensions in Yemen, with escalating attacks by armed groups, especially the Houthi militia and the AQAP. 

While de-escalation continued after the official expiration of the October 2022 truce, the military escalation on the ground on a number of fronts and the Houthis’ carrying out armed attacks against ships, Israel, and US forces portend a return of war to the country.

On December 19, the Houthi militia announced that they had targeted 211 ships since November 2023, and that they used 1,170 ballistic and winged missiles, drones, and drone boats during their military operations. They launched missiles targeting the Israeli depth in Tel Aviv, which led to a series of retaliatory Israeli air strikes against the port of Hodeidah, on power facilities, and Sanaa International Airport. The American-British air strikes on the Houthis began in early 2024. This ‘South24 Center’ annual report monitored 166 Houthi attacks on naval and military ships in international waters since January 2024, besides 38 attacks against targets in Israel. According to figures published by the Houthis, the Iran-backed militia were able to shoot down about 12 MQ-9 American Reaper drones in several Yemeni governorates. The US army has not confirmed all of these incidents.

The Houthi militia likely carried out 33 attacks against the southern forces affiliated with the STC during the year, across several governorates. Al-Dhalea was the most affected with 15 attacks, followed by Lahj with 10 attacks, while Shabwa, Marib and the western coast (Hodeidah) witnessed a smaller number of operations. These attacks resulted in the killing of 47 soldiers and the wounding of eight others. Al-Dhalea witnessed the highest number of casualties with 17 dead and five wounded. March, April, and May saw the highest number with five attacks per month. The Houthis launched attacks on other fronts in Taiz and Marib in the center of the country where the forces affiliated with the PLC are active. 

On the other hand, the AQAP carried out 21 attacks during the year, most of which targeted the Southern forces in Abyan and Shabwa. These attacks killed 48 soldiers and injured 63 others. With 18 attacks, Abyan was the most affected, especially in Mudiyah district, while Shabwa witnessed three attacks. Explosive devices were the weapon most used by the AQAP in 10 attacks, followed by direct assault by AQAP gunmen in nine attacks. The terrorist organization used drones and car bombs in other attacks.

Through 2024, the pace of the AQAP attacks was varying. January recorded the biggest rate with three attacks, followed by two attacks each in February and March. The number of attacks decreased to only one for each in the subsequent months of April, May, June, July, August, September, and October. This reflects a period of a relative decline in the pace of the attacks.

However, the attacks escalated again at the end of the year, with two attacks in November while December was the bloodiest with five attacks.

In March, the AQAP announced the death of its leader Khaled Batarfi in ambiguous circumstances and the appointment of Saad Bin Atef Al-Awlaki as the new Emir. Reports, including one prepared by UNSC experts interested in Yemen, reveal growing cooperation and coordination between the AQAP and the Houthis to target the STC and the Yemeni Internationally-Recognized Government.

However, the Southern forces responded to this by launching counter military operations through which they succeeded in dismantling armed cells and securing strategic locations in Abyan. They also carried out anti-Houthi operations, including controlling locations beside the border between Lahj and Taiz (the Musaymir front). Notably, the escalating attacks and the use of modern weapons technology reflect the growing challenges against the efforts to achieve stability. At the end of December, the AQAP announced the execution of 11 persons on espionage charges, including Yemeni journalist Mohammed Al-Maqri, who they had abducted during the past years. 

The Southern forces opened some security facilities in Aden and Shabwa after refurbishing them with UAE support, including the new headquarters of the Aden Security Department. New military batches graduated from the state facilities in Aden, Marib, and Mukalla.

It can be said that the end of 2024 witnessed a spike in the pace of military operations, whether carried out by the Houthis or the AQAP. Thus, the two groups continue to be the most prominent threat locally and regionally. With the intensity of the Houthi operations in Taiz, Al-Dhalea, and other areas amid the escalation of the mutual strikes between them and Israel in addition to the continuous US airstrikes, most indications suggest a possible larger return of the military operations against the Iran-backed group locally. However, such a comeback is more related to the nature of the policy adopted by Washington toward the Yemeni file after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President on January 20, 2025. This is along with the Saudi stance toward all these developments.

The Economic Axis

By Abullah Alshadli

In 2024, the Yemeni economy witnessed big challenges that have deepened the current crises, casting a shadow on different vital sectors in the South where the Internationally-Recognized Government holds control. The local currency continued its collapse as the exchange rate of the US dollar increased from 1,533 Yemeni riyals early in the year to more than 2,050 by December 2024, which is the biggest drop since the Houthi-enforced cessation of oil exports from the Southern governorates in 2022. The fall in the Yemeni riyal’s value was accompanied by a remarkable decline in the ability of the Central Bank in Aden to effectively intervene to control the monetary market. This is due to the lack of foreign reserves and the exacerbation of economic divisions between the South and the North which is under Houthi control.

The continuous cessation of oil exports from Hadramout and Shabwa for the second year in a row due to the Houthis attacks and threats has been among the most prominent causes behind the economic crisis in the country. According to the Central Bank in Aden, the total losses from the cessation of oil and gas exports exceeded $6 billion till October 2024. This has dealt a severe blow to the national economy which relies largely on oil revenues to cover the government expenses and pay the employees’ salaries. It has also led to a more than 30% decline in the government’s revenues, deepening the financial deficit gap and directly affecting basic services and development projects.

In the Houthi-controlled Northern areas, the use of the old currency continued, creating a gap in the exchange rate compared to South Yemen. The US exchange rate in Sanaa reached 537 Yemeni riyals, which is much better than the riyal’s value in Aden. However, the prices of basic commodities and services did not witness much difference between the North and the South. This reflects a bigger inflation rate in the South than the North where the Houthis imposed additional levies and taxes that have burdened citizens and companies alike.

The economic crisis increased the poverty rates in Yemen to unprecedented levels. The World Bank stated that 74% of people in Yemen live under the poverty line. Reports prepared by the World Food Programme warned that 50% of families in Yemen suffer from an acute lack of food, pushing them to reduce the number of their daily meals. Aden, Taiz, and Hadramout have witnessed widespread protests against the poor living conditions and the soaring food and fuel prices. Despite the ongoing economic collapse, the Central Bank in Aden achieved some progress at the level of controlling monetary policy after reducing its dependence on printing uncovered local currency. This is considered a long-term positive move. In 2024, the bank conducted 13 foreign exchange auctions in 2024 compared to 41 auctions in 2023, a decrease that reflects the impact of the crisis on the bank’s ability to provide foreign exchange. However, these efforts aren’t enough to ease pressure on the local currency or improve the overall economic situation.

The economic crisis has been complicated by the Central Bank’s reversal of the punitive decisions and measures against banks and financial institutions under Houthi control in Sanaa. Undertaken under pressure and Saudi intervention, this step destroyed the remaining trust in official state institutions and gave the Houthis an opportunity to continue their hostile approach against the economy in the Southern areas.

The economic crisis clearly affected the basic services. Cities in South Yemen, especially Aden and Mukalla, witnessed in 2024 repeated power outages that reached 20 hours a day in the peak of the summer. In an attempt to mitigate the crisis, the Emirati solar power plant in Aden entered into service with a production capacity of 120 megawatts, leading to a limited improvement in the power supply.

At the infrastructure level, limited efforts focused on road and water rehabilitation projects with support from international donors. In Hadramout, for example, several solar energy and water projects were launched, funded by international organizations. However, their impact remained limited compared to the magnitude of the needs.

Despite the harsh conditions, some positive indications emerged during the year. Flights between Aden, Dubai and Kuwait resumed for the first time in years, reflecting a slight improvement in the transport sector. Starlink satellite internet service was launched in Yemen, providing an opportunity to improve connectivity in remote and underserved areas. 

In North Yemen, the fact that Sanaa International Airport has been out of service since the December 26 Israeli airstrikes on its control tower and runways may increase the deterioration of humanitarian and economic conditions within the Houthi-controlled areas.

With the continuation of the conflict and economic divisions, the World Bank warned that Yemen’s GDP in 2024 may decrease by an additional 1% after a 2% decline in 2023. A UNDP report indicated that the economic losses may reach $657 billion by 2030 in case of the continuation of the war and the Houthi rejection of peace. This reflects the scale of challenges facing Yemen considering the ongoing conflict.

Days before the end of 2024, the Yemeni government announced that Saudi Arabia released $200 million of its previous financial grant to support Yemen’s struggling economy. This is in addition to the $300 million to support the Yemen Central Bank. The grant will contribute to covering some of the government's operating expenses during the first months of 2025. It may keep the currency rate at the late 2024 levels for a limited period. However, amid the absence of essential economic reforms by the government, concerns remain about the fate of these funds.

Humanitarian Axis

By Reem Alfadli

2024 witnessed the continued escalation of the humanitarian crises in Yemen with its repercussions hitting various aspects of life. According to the UN estimates, 18.2 million people in Yemen needed humanitarian aid during the year, which represents more than 55% of the population. This number includes 17.6 million who suffer from severe food insecurity. The World Food Programme said that Yemen is one of the countries most affected by hunger in the world, as 17.1 million people are suffering from severe food insecurity, including 3.3 million children, and pregnant and lactating women suffering from severe malnutrition. According to Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, four districts in Taiz and Hodeidah reached the fifth stage of the “starvation phase” with acute malnutrition in these areas rising sharply, exceeding 30%, especially among children.

Health challenges in Yemen exacerbated with nearly 250,000 cholera cases and 816 deaths documented since the beginning of 2024, according to the World Health Organization. Yemen also came in the top of the 89% percentage regarding the cVDPV2 vaccine-derived polio cases documented in the region (33 cases among children). The malaria and dengue crisis also worsened, with 1,051,287 malaria cases and 13,739 dengue cases recorded. Acute malnutrition escalated among children in government-controlled areas in Yemen, according to a study by UN agencies and partners. It said 600,000 children under five are at risk of acute malnutrition, including 120,000 who are severely malnourished, the highest rates in 40 years. Furthermore, the WHO indicated that 17.8 million people lack basic healthcare, while 17.4 million suffer from poor water and sanitation services.

Regarding human rights violations, reports pointed out that the Houthis escalated targeting workers affiliated with international organizations and the civil society. These violations include arbitrary arrests, confiscation of property, and espionage accusations against some employees. Moreover, the spread of mines and explosive devices killed and injured hundreds of people. Around 680 mine-related incidents were recorded during the year that killed several women and children.

While the poverty increased to 74% of people with food deprivation rates doubling in several governorates, reports stressed that 62% of Yemeni households could not meet their basic food needs due to the soaring prices of food products and the decline of humanitarian support. This led to the escalation of popular protests in governorates such as Aden, Taiz and Hadramout. Sweden’s announcement about cutting off its aid to Yemen has disappointed thousands of people who rely on foreign support.

Yemen’s climate situation remarkably deteriorated in 2024. The heavy rains and floods killed 122 persons and injured 167 others. Torrents and floods affected more than 34,846 persons in several governorates, leading to the displacement of thousands of people. World Bank reports indicated that extreme weather patterns will affect food and livelihood security in Yemen unless urgent measures are taken.

Yemen achieved progress in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index as it ranked 154th compared to 168th in 2023.