The Fate of the Riyadh Agreement in Light of Recent Development

The parties of the Yemeni crisis concerned with completing the implementation of the provisions of the Riyadh Agreement were forced to stop continuing talks on it due to the recent military tensions in the governorates of Shabwa and Abyan, and because of what the STC says as a major party in the talks; that there is a deliberate action by parties in the Hadi government to thwart the efforts of the Saudis.

So far, things seem unclear in terms of the details discussed during the last period; Except for some statements here and there about arrangements for the return of the parity government to the Southern capital, Aden, which seems that the STC was keen and still is on its return in order to take responsibility for the outstanding files, foremost the file of services. But the government, according to the STC’s media, always invokes the security aspect, despite the STC delegation’s statements that government’s return and security arrangements are linked to the commands of the joint operations of the Arab coalition.

On the other hand, the position of the other party in the parity government seemed sharp towards the STC, accusing the latter of impeding the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement through escalation measures and not assisting the government return and secure its headquarters in Aden. It appears that the recent military appointments issued by Aidrous Al-Zubaidi, STC President, caused a kind of provocation to the government and Riyadh alike. Saudi Aarabia issued a statement considering that such measures are a violation of the terms of the Riyadh Agreement and are inconsistent with it, calling on the two parties to respond to what has been agreed upon and renounce their differences1.

At the same time, the STC considers the appointments internal affairs related to the strength of his military structure, justifying this by the unreasonableness of the Minister of Defense of Al-Maqdashi or General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar to issue such decisions within the mainly independent STC forces which were not integrated within the scope of the military units of the pro-government Army. In addition, the political appointments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and unilateral moves, despite the political partnership within the framework of a parity government are similarly unjustified without referring to the STC, according to its activists. How do parties in the government denounce the political and military appointments made by the STC while the government is basically working alone.

This is the same thing that was followed by the government of Maeen in dealing with the recent appointments of Aden governor, Ahmed Lamlas, which it rejected and opposed claiming it was a violation although it is the prerogative of the local authority in Aden. But at the same time it turns a blind eye to similar appointments in other governorates, including Shabwa, Marib and Mahra, that are not subject to the STC's authority, in a kind of double standards in dealing with the parties.

Other than that, the main point of contention between the two parties to the Riyadh Agreement was the eighth item, which stipulates the formation of a joint negotiating delegation, and that the STC has the right to be represented in any upcoming peace process, but procrastination and evasion are always present from the other party, according to STC statements on the issue. In addition to other points of contention, including the withdrawal of the Yemeni Army forces that have come from Marib to Shabwa and parts of Abyan since August 2019, and their return to their positions, to be replaced by the Shabwani Elite and Security Belt forces.

The greater reliance on the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement was not placed on its two sides as much as it was dependent on the role of the sponsor of the agreement and its great influence on the parties and the size of its political power in the Yemeni scene. However, it is noticeable that the local Yemeni comments on this sponsorship were limited to the Saudi ambassador to Yemen, Mohammad Al Jaber, whose political presence in the agreement with the Yemeni public outweighed the presence of his country itself. However, some observers attribute the rise of the ambassador's personal presence to his official/formal presence; Because of what they considered the old relations he enjoyed with parties in the government since he took over the military attaché in his country’s embassy in Sanaa 2009; Which he said in more than one interview that it provided him with establishing strong diplomatic and personal relations in Yemen2. This might be an advantage that the STC does not enjoy in the negotiations to implement the Riyadh Agreement compared to the other party.