How Will The Saudi Understandings With The Houthis End?

It seems that any agreement to renew the truce will achieve progress for the first time regarding releasing the Saudi prisoners held by the Houthis. It is expected that the Houthis will delay carrying out other humanitarian obligations related to the Yemenis’ interests including lifting the blockade on crossings. The agreement will be like giving a ransom to the Houthis, whether by Saudi Arabia or by giving them a share of Marib oil in return for releasing the Saudi prisoners. This is in the wake of the visit by the Saudi military delegation to Sanaa in October to check their identities. This was confirmed by Abdulqadir Al-Murtada, the Head of the National Committee for Prisoners’ Affairs, which is affiliated to the Houthis. He tweeted that “the visit aimed at checking their names and identifying them on the ground and was not related to any other discussions or political dialogue”. 

Accordingly, after implementing this aspect by giving the Houthis oil or financial revenues in return for releasing prisoners, it is likely that the expected prolonged truce will end without reaching a framework for comprehensive peace negotiations or even agreeing on renewing it again. The Houthis will resort to demanding new conditions through which they can make additional political and financial gains. This either would lead to the return of the military confrontations on the ground or to comprehensive peace based upon the Houthi conditions. This depends on the strength or weakness of unity in the ranks of the “legitimate government”. This also linked to the KSA priorities in this regard related to its regional calculations in light of the tense relationship between the European Union and Iran and the possible Israeli military strike against Tehran after the return of the far right wing, led by Netanyahu, to power. 

Economically, it turns out that the Houthis have long been preparing to seize the opportunity to impose their preconditions for access to oil revenues. Their negotiations over the past years regarding the floating oil storage vessel "Safer" off the port of Ras Isa in Hodeidah governorate revealed their rejection of any options related to dealing with the crisis of the dilapidated tanker which contains 1.1 million barrels of oil. The latest solutions in this regard included replacing it with another ship through an UN-sponsored project which costs 144 million$. This would be significantly different from the value of the stored oil. Through this solution, The Houthis will guarantee keeping using oil as a military deterrent and a time bomb if the conformations return again in Hodeidah. This will also serve their negotiation terms regarding oil revenues, especially that finding an alternative vessel will keep the floating oil exporting port at Ras Isa running. The latter is the source through which Marib oil is exported from the upstream "Saffer Fields" to the downstream "Safer tanker" in Ras Isa in Hodeidah. It turns out that the conditions have long been in the Houthi agenda. They put them on the table with the imminent replacement of the old debilitated vessel with a new one. This would enable them not just obtaining crude oil but also selling it in the global market as well recognizing doing business with them. 

If a truce is reached and later collapses or not extended, the Houthis will likely launch a strong attack against Marib as a main source of the crude oil. They will likely target the oil facilities there if the attack fails. What enhances the possibility of attacking Marib is the lack of order and the weakness of the Third Military District as well as the failure to make the receiving and delivery role in the Al-Jawf Military Axis. This is due to the Islah’s rejection of the new appointments there. It seems that the Islah Party deals with them as a barter card with Saudi Arabia in light of the pressure against the party by Southerners and their allies regarding driving the military forces affiliated with it out of the Wadi and Desert Hadramout.

If the regional forces and the international communities impose a comprehensive peace agreement on the “legitimacy” components to accept it according to the current arrangements, especially that some regional and international parties offer the Houthis unacceptable concessions which don’t suit other Yemeni actors, the Southerners will likely adopt a stance to keep control on the areas outside such an agreement. However, keeping important areas such as the valley and desert of Hadramout as well as Al-Mahra outside the control of the Southern forces weakens the Southern position although it is expected that they will stick to refusal.